The Big Picture trends, drivers, wild cards, discontinuities and weak signals Ozcan Saritas a,,*Jack E. Smith b a Manchester Institute of Innovation research, University of Manchester, Oxford Road, M13 9pl Manchester, UK b Federal Foresight & Innovation strategy, Defence
R&d Canada, 305 Rideau St.,8th Floor, CJ02 Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K1a 0k2 1. Introduction One of the recurring items of feedback from previous FTA Symposia
drivers of change and prospective discontinuities that might be expected within 5 10 or 15 years. The rationale for this concern tended to be expressed in these terms:
an opportunity to contribute to a value-adding Futures 43 (2011) 292 312 A r T I C L E I N F O Article history:
Available online 19 november 2010 A b s T R A c T Following work done in the UK, Canada and now starting across Europe,
what to expect between 2010 and 2025 as the character of the 21st century begins to become firmly established.
What are the shaping forces, or sources of change and what might be their impacts,
particularly where these may create entirely new challenges and opportunities? Futures experts (attendees of the FTA 2008 Conference) were invited to state their opinions on these questions by considering the trends, drivers, wilds cards,
discontinuities and weak signals likely to shape the future through the Big Picture Survey. The survey was launched 6 months prior to the Conference.
More than 250 responses were submitted by the Conference date. The results collected were synthesised and presented back to the attendees in a plenary presentation by the authors.
The current paper aims to clarify the concepts first by suggesting definitions and discussing the distinctions between them.
presents its methodology and discusses the results of the survey in a greater extent. 2010 Elsevier Ltd.
Global Futures Forum Vancouver April 2008, Europe@2025 European commission. Contents lists available at Sciencedirect Futures journal homepage:
www. elsevier. com/locate/futures 0016-3287/$ see front matter 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:
The originators of this survey used the responses to lead a plenary discussion at the 2008 FTA Conference,
In its Science and Innovation Investment Framework 2004 2014, the UK Government committed to establishing a Centre of Excellence in Horizon scanning
so it is deemed even more important to work toward a more commonly accepted set of definitions for purposes of future work in this area. 2. 1. Trends The starting point for scanning definitions is usually to identify the key trends which are presently evident in the broad sense of being both discernible
at least insofar as they usually endure as influential shapers for at least 4 5 years until succeeded by others.
Some analysts have attempted to distinguish trends by their degree of influence 3. 3 It is also possible to further analyse trends according to their duration, scale,
The increase in population from the Palaeolithic period to the present provides an example. 2 The UK Department for Environment,
as well as persistent problems or trends''(http://horizonscanning. defra. gov. uk last visited on March 14, 2009.
O. Saritas, J. E. Smith/Futures 43 (2011) 292 312 293 Potential trends Possible new trends grow from innovations, projects,
just a few years ago, alternative medicine remained an outcast from modern medicine. Now it has links with big business
policies and business focus over periods of several years that usually have global reach. What is interesting about trends is that normally most players,
O. Saritas, J. E. Smith/Futures 43 (2011) 292 312 294 As one can see there are subtle differences from trends.
and forces that change from year to year and may be amenable to stakeholder actions and strategic choices by way of one's investments, new alignments, infrastructure, R&d,
forks in the road and deep uncertainties that keep executives awake at night. In this context, the definition for drivers of change was decided to focus on things that are accessible
The attacks of September 11, 2001, which created significant shocks to the global security, airport screening and intelligence systems and practices;
'Steinmueller 8 also has an excellent overview of wild cards in the 2008 RAHS Booklet on Foresight:
O. Saritas, J. E. Smith/Futures 43 (2011) 292 312 295 Building on Petersen's work, Barber 9 developed an additional wild cards
rapid progress of ICT and biotech End of Moore's Law 100 years life expectancy Environment:
An example from the 1960s is the introduction of the electronic calculator. In a very short time, slide rules and mechanical calculators disappeared and, in some cases,
the companies that made these products disappeared when they could not adapt to or find ways to use the new technology.
O. Saritas, J. E. Smith/Futures 43 (2011) 292 312 296 Recent reports about accelerated arctic ice shelf melting and greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere
if realised within the next decade, could fundamentally alter our ways of making materials, practicing medicine and computation-making calculations, with pervasive societal impacts.
Discontinuities are those situations impacts where over time and extending beyond single events, change is rapid
so for example, James Hanson's presentation to the US Congress in 1988 about possible global warming on the horizon,
or in technology terms, the speed of take up ofMosaic''(precursor to Netscape) as the first Internet browser in 1993,
were hard to estimate at the time, but can now clearly be seen as being indicative of things to come.
and signs usually associated with early developments in technologies, societal innovations, conflicts, origins of conflicts, etc. that while not easily verifiable from a present day perspective.
but not confirmed changes that may later become more significant indicators of critical forces for development, threats, business and technical innovation.
Weak signal examples In the 1980s the first mention was made of global warming and climate change;
The collapse of the Berlin Wall and subsequently the Soviet union was weakly discernible in the mid 1980s through assessments of military capacities and responses to theStar wars''initiatives;
The growing importance of nanotechnology was first apparent as early as 1986 when Eric Drexler issued his first book on the subject. 4 http://www. metsafoorumi. fi/dokumentit/newsletter3 05. pdf. 5 http://hosting. fountainpark. com/strategysignals/.
/O. Saritas, J. E. Smith/Futures 43 (2011) 292 312 297 3. Big Picture Survey 3. 1. Motivation and approach Up until the Future-oriented technology analysis
(FTA) 2008 Conference, previous FTA meetings tended to focus on methodology, policy linkages and success factors for Foresight design & delivery.
The Scientific Committee of the FTA 2008 Conference heard that some attendees felt that an opportunity had been missed to discuss future Foresight determinants
1. Years of Foresight experience; 2. Country of residence; 3. Affiliation-type of organization represented. Then, the in the second part, the respondents were asked to identify a list of trends, drivers of change, wild cards/shocks, weak signals and discontinuities.
3. Estimated time horizon: 2008 2015; 2016 2025; beyond 2025.3.1.2. Data set Total surveys submitted:
293; substantive completion: 106 (about 50%of FTA Conference attendees; Respondent Distribution Charts by: years of experience, country of residence and affiliation;(
3) 15 STEEP Categories for each domain of interest: i e. trends, drivers, shocks, discontinuities and weak signals=75 cells of content (Table 1;
Qualitative review of Foresight (content) insights and patterns; 3. 1. 3. Further analysis Analysis of each of the Domains of Interest according to%distribution by years of experience, country of residence, affiliation;
Analysis of assessed impact, likelihood, controversy, time horizon patterns; Comparison of FTA COMMUNITY insights-domains content with others sources of Foresight trends, drivers, etc.
Table 1 STEEP map for the Domains of Interest. Sub-categories (A b c) to classify Domains of Interest 1. Society & Culture Social Norms, Education, Information & Knowledge society Demographics, Urbanization, Population Health & Migration Equity, Ethical
J. E. Smith/Futures 43 (2011) 292 312 298 e g. do those with more years of experience tend to use greater differentiation in their scoring?
or government respondents see the prospective developments in longer or shorter time horizons than the business respondents?
Results can serve as baseline for a more quantitative-reactive survey next year likely generating a higher return rate requiring less time to formulate original ideas. 3. 2. Analysis of the results 3. 2. 1. Descriptive statistics
The majority of respondents engaged in Foresight activity 5 10 years as expected a quite experienced group of professionals (Fig. 2). The survey respondents were mainly from Academia and Governmental bodies (Fig. 3). 3. 2. 2
O. Saritas, J. E. Smith/Futures 43 (2011) 292 312 299 The diagram illustrates that:
The respondents with more than 15 years of experience constituted the largest single group, comprising more than a quarter of the total of all respondents clear evidence of the substantial experience present at the FTA Conference.
O. Saritas, J. E. Smith/Futures 43 (2011) 292 312 300 Table 2 Examples of trends.
and need for management Aging/labor force ratio creating tensions Negative prospects from genetic manipulationPrivacy loss''as 21st century externality Pandemic risks increase Genetically designed children will be possible Dematerialisation the West
and migration Strategic cyber intrusions attacks shut downs Water is the oil in the 21st century Disintegration of states,
O. Saritas, J. E. Smith/Futures 43 (2011) 292 312 301 years experienced groups. We believe that this strong contribution from the more experienced contributors supports the basic assumption behind the survey that such a gathering of experts would constitute a uniquely defined relevant cohort worthy of sampling
Furthermore, high impact assessment is more prevalent among the more highly experienced respondents(>10 years. Likelihood and time horizon assessment.
The majority of the trends were considered to be medium to high probability of occurrence. The respondents stated that over 65%of the trends are likely to occur.
The time of occurrence for most of the trends was considered to be from 2016 to 2025.
Respondents believe that around 30%of the trends will occur in the short term (before 2015.
Assessed together with the time horizon, the survey respondents generally expect that the highest controversies are likely to emerge from 2016 to 2025.3.2.2.3.
Joint assessment of country of residence and trends. Amajority of the respondents (over 55%)that assessed
%Likelihood and time horizon assessment. Almost all respondents from all regions considered that there is a medium to high level of occurrence of the trends identified. 75%of the North american respondents considered that the likelihood of occurrence was high,
The majority of the respondents from Australasia (60%)stated that the trends will occur in the short term (before 2015.
More than half of the respondents from North america and the EU countries suggested a medium time horizon (between 2016 and 2025) for the occurrence of the trends identified.
Likelihood and time horizon assessment. Similarly no significant differences were encountered between the different affiliation category groups.
Whereas, the majority of respondents from Academia and NGOS (51%and 58%respectively) considered that the trends will occur between 2016 and 2025
whereas the majority of the respondents from business envisaged shorter time horizon for the emergence of trends (between 2008 and 2015.
The responses from the respondents from governments were balanced more between long, medium and short time horizons.
O. Saritas, J. E. Smith/Futures 43 (2011) 292 312 302 Fig. 7 shows the frequency distribution of drivers of change and the most widely cited ones.
A balanced distribution is observed among the respondents with 1 3, 5 10 and over 15 years experience.
except the respondents with 10 15 years experience, who considered that about one third of drivers have low probability of occurrence.
Time horizon. All respondents from less than 1 year experience to more than 15 years considered that the majority of the drivers will occur between 2016 and 2025.3.2.3.2.
Joint assessment of country of residence and drivers of change. Approximately 60%of the drivers were assessed by the EU-27 respondents.
O. Saritas, J. E. Smith/Futures 43 (2011) 292 312 303 Impact assessment. There was a general consensus among all respondents around the globe that around 65%of the drivers will have high impact
Likelihood and time horizon assessment. The respondents from North america and the EU countries suggested similar assessments for the likelihood of occurrence of the drivers identified.
The majority of respondents from the EU member and associate countries and North america considered that around half of the drivers will occur between 2016 and 2025.
whereas the majority of the respondents from the EU Candidate countries assessed the time horizon for the occurrence of drivers after 2025.3.2.3.3.
Likelihood and time horizon assessment. The majority of respondents from Academia and NGOS expected a medium level of likelihood of occurrence for the drivers identified.
life prolongation Technological innovation to create inexpensive self-diagnostic devices Development of a global e-science community The new human:
J. E. Smith/Futures 43 (2011) 292 312 304 affiliations expect high likelihood of occurrence.
The majority of the all respondents (around 50%)consider that the drivers will emerge from 2016 to 2025.
O. Saritas, J. E. Smith/Futures 43 (2011) 292 312 305 include those identified in Table 4 that would have unknown implications because of they were to appear,
Again, to be able to embody there types of wild cards into some scenarios could be a provocative and rewarding exercise to test some of the leverage points that may impact change
if any of these eventually emerge. 3. 2. 4. 1. Further assessment of wild cards/shocks by time horizon,
Experience time horizon. As the years of experience increased, the time horizon for the occurrence of wild cards tended to remain between 2016 and 2025.
Respondents with no experience expected that the wild cards would occur after 2025, whereas the respondents with maximum 3 years of experience had a shorter time horizon (2008 2015).
Affiliation time horizon. Regarding the affiliation of participants, the time of occurrence for wild cards indicates parallelism between the respondents from Academia, Business and Other affiliations,
who have a medium term time horizon. While the time horizon for students and NGO respondents is longer,
it is the opposite for the participants from the Government, where the majority (40%)has a shorter time horizon for the occurrence of wild cards.
Country of residence time horizon. Respondents from the EU Candidate countries have a longer time horizon,
compared to the respondents from the rest of Europe. The respondents from North america have balanced a more distribution of time horizons among short
medium and long terms. Table 4 Examples of wild cards/shocks. Examples of wild cards shocks by category A b c Society & Culture 42 Rise of dogma, e g. creativism/creationism, social resistance to technological change New diseases from pharmaceutical and space
research Intolerance of science to renew moral outrage over genetic modification, trans-humanist research, etc.
Strong classes between cultures, intensification of conflicts between cultural classes Population boom & high competition in job markets Decline of knowledge grounded in local society and history because of less direct human interaction
Blockage of free trade due to a major pandemic Science & Tech. 9 Big disasters in science creation of out-of-control species, viruses, robots Disruption of technological systems Artificial intelligence passes human capacity Shocking scientific discovery challenges all hitherto received ideas, e g.,
, interrestrial visitors, alliance, eco-collapse, biotech Increased impact of converging technologies on social life Natural language codifications becomes available allowing people communicate globally New s&t paradigms for knowledge society
redistribution of wealth to enable the achievement of millennium development goals New Islamic superpower Rapid climate change overwhelms human capacity Massive failure of capitalism
O. Saritas, J. E. Smith/Futures 43 (2011) 292 312 306 3. 2. 5. Discontinuities The orientations of discontinuities are represented with the following radar diagram
years of experience and country of origin) demonstrates particular significance with respect to the differentiation and sophistication of responses.()
O. Saritas, J. E. Smith/Futures 43 (2011) 292 312 307 3. 2. 5. 1. Joint assessment of Foresight experience and discontinuities.
Over 33%of the discontinuities were defined by the respondents with over 15 years experience. Respondents with 5 10 years experience also contributed significantly (over 27%.
%Impact assessment. The majority of the drivers identified were identified as likely to have high impact on the STEEP systems with the rest of the drivers (approximately a quarter of them) likely to have medium impact.
Likelihood and time horizon assessment. The likelihood of occurrence for about 50%of the discontinuities identified was considered to be medium.
Different from the other groups, respondents with 5 15 years experience considered that more than 50%of the discontinuities will occur with the realisation time between 2016 and 2025.
Inexperienced respondents(<1 year) considered that most of the discontinuities will be observed in the short run (before 2015
whereas the most experienced respondents expect that the discontinuities will occur in the medium run (2016 2025.
The candidate country respondents constituted the second largest group. Impact assessment. The impacts of the discontinuities identified were considered to be high by most of the respondents around the globe.
Likelihood and time horizon assessment. Strong disagreements were observed regarding the likelihood of occurrence of the drivers identified.
On the other hand 67%of the respondents from Australasia considered the likelihood of occurrence medium. 45%of North american respondents expect that the discontinuities will occur after 2025,
whereas most of the EU member country respondents suggest that the discontinuities will emerge between 2016 and 2025.
and deniers create discontinuity Global security issues rise, e g. nuclear crisis O. Saritas, J. E. Smith/Futures 43 (2011) 292 312 308 2016
to 2025. These differences suggest some further survey or focus group opportunities to probe the differences in perception of discontinuities. 3. 2. 5. 3. Joint assessment of Foresight affiliation and discontinuities.
Likelihood and time horizon assessment. Regarding the likelihood of occurrence of discontinuities, the responses from Academia,
The figures changed slightly in the assessment of time horizons. This time Academia and Business suggested that most of the discontinuities would emerge from 2016 to 2025
whereas students and Governmental respondents expected a longer time horizon (beyond 2025. 3. 2. 6. Weak signals The radar diagram below (Fig. 12) shows the orientations of the 171 weak signals identified by the respondents of the Big Picture Survey.
The following observations were made after the analysis of the Weak signals:(TD$FIG Fig. 12. Orientations of weak signals.
O. Saritas, J. E. Smith/Futures 43 (2011) 292 312 309 Good response with 171 weak signals;
of weak signals by time horizon, affiliation and country of residence. Experience time horizon. The respondents with a Foresight experience longer than 1 year expect most the majority of the weak signals to emerge in the medium term future (2016 2025),
whereas the inexperienced respondents have a longer time horizon (beyond 2025). This is likely due to the familiarity that older
and more experienced contributors have with how fast changes can really appear from insight to application.
Affiliation time horizon. The majority of the Business respondents have a longer term time horizon (beyond 2025) compared to the respondents from Academia
and Governments who consider that most of the weak signals will occur in the mid-term (2016 2025).
Country of residence time horizon. Regardless the country of residence most of the respondents have medium term time horizon, with a higher emphasis from the EU Associate countries.
Table 6 Examples of weak signals. Examples of weak signals by category A b c Society & Culture 61 Concept of rational behaviour in modernity losing value
and impact People might be eating plastics due to photo-degraded plastics in environments (e g. eaten by fish) Different ethical vision science built Stronger impact of artists Increase of genetic and hereditary
diseases Acceptance of new culture in arts, architecture, law and life styles Dependence on anti-factual information, failing roots of knowledge and understanding Declining male fertility Human cloning Science & Tech. 33 Ubiquitous connectivity web
2. 0, Facebook, second life.Lag of the real behind the virtual''Biotech revolution and robotics change human race Less usage of human brain Freedom to do any type of Research breakthrough in plant gene to create antibiotics for cancer Nano membranes allow humans swim under water without air tubes Researchers
J. E. Smith/Futures 43 (2011) 292 312 310 4. Conclusions and implications on policy and strategy The following implications from the outputs of the Big Picture Survey
one that could provoke a more consistent and comprehensive response over time. The current paper aims to establish a methodological base.
Another paper dedicated to a further elaboration of the BPS results is planned by the authors in 2009.
even though time did not permit a full analysis of the data. Further analysis will include:(
1) trends and drivers by experience, country of residence and affiliation and also by responses on impact, likelihood, controversy and horizon time;(
So wait for the next iteration in 2010. In summary, the authors are excited by how this information might be dissected further
Our primary conclusion is that it will be very useful to repeat the survey with FTA 2010 if possible,
and extend it to other similar groups, in the next year or two, for comparison purposes.
identifying common strategic choices and questions for knowledge, Science and Public policy 37 (1)( 2010) 7 18.2 S. Rijkers-Defrasne, E. Amanatidou, A. Braun, A. Pechmann,
the EFMN issue analysis, Foresight 10 (2008) 6, 90 102.3 DCDC, The DCDC Global Strategic Trends Programme:
2007 2036, third edition, Swindon, 2007. Available at: http://www. mod. uk/NR/rdonlyres/94a1f45ea883049db-B319-DF68C28D561D/0/strat trends 17mar07. pdf (last visited on:
January 30, 2009. 4 N. Damrongchai, P. Satangput, G. Tegart, C. Sripaipan, Future technology analysis for biosecurity and emerging infectious diseases in Asia-pacific, Science and Public policy 37 (1)( 2010
) 41 50.5 Wikipedia, Futurology, 2009. Available at: http://en. wikipedia. org/wiki/Futurology#Weak signals. 2c the future sign and wild cards (last visited on:
March 14, 2009. 6 J. Smith, Presentation at the Centre for Innovation studies, Thecis Breakfast Edmonton Alberta, January 13th, 2009.7 J. Petersen, Out of the blue How to Anticipate Big Future Surprises, Madison Books, 2000.8
K. Steinmueller, Thinking about The Future-Strategic Anticipation and RAHS by Risk assessment and Horizon scanning (RAHS), National Security Coordination Secretariat, Singapore, 2008.9 M. P. Barber,
Wildcards signals from a future near you, Journal of Future Studies 11 (2006) 1. 10 N. N. Taleb, The Black swan:
The Impact of the Highly Improbable, Random House Publishing, New york, 2007.11 P. van Notten, A m. Sleegersb, M. van Asselt, The future shocks:
On discontinuity and scenario development, Technological forecasting & Social Change 72 (2005) 2, 175 194.12 S. Mendonc¸A m. P. Cunha, F. Ruff, J. Kaivo-oja
preparing for wild cards in the civil aircraft and asset-management industries, Long Range Planning 42 (1)( 2009) 23 41.
O. Saritas, J. E. Smith/Futures 43 (2011) 292 312 311 13 K. Steinmueller, Wild cards for Europe, Z punkt, 2003.
March 14, 2009. 14 R c. Jantz, Technological Discontinuities in the Library: Digital Projects that Illustrate New Opportunities for the Librarian and the Library, in:
66th IFLA Council and General Conference, Jerusalem, Israel, 13 18 august 2000. Available at: http://www. ifla. org/IV/ifla66/papers/006-120e. htm (last visited on:
March 14, 2009. 15 Social Technologies, Discontinuity: Mobility, 2008. Available at: http://www. socialtechnologies. com/Fileview. aspx?
filename=PR DISCONTINUITIES MOBILITTYV2%20ks%20mh%20eds final. pdf (last visited on: March 14, 2009. 16 E. Hiltunen, Weak signals, Presentation given at the Finland futures research centre, 2007.
Available at: http://www. slideshare. net/whatidiscover/weaksiggnal (last visited on: March 14, 2009. 17 Y. Nugroho, O. Saritas, Incorporating network perspectives in Foresight:
a methodological proposal, Foresight 11 (2009) 6, 21 41. O. Saritas, J. E. Smith/Futures 43 (2011) 292 312 312
The influence of future-oriented technology analysis: Addressing the Cassandra challenge§Ron Johnston a,,*Cristiano Cagnin b a Australian Centre for Innovation, Australia b European commission, DG Joint research Centre, Institute for Prospective Technological Studies, SpainCassandra was a daughter of Hecuba
and King Priam, the rulers of Troy during the Trojan war according to Homer's Illiad. Cassandra was a beautiful young woman, blessed with the gift of prophecy by Apollo,
who was infatuated with her. Unfortunately, she shunned Apollo at the last minute and he added a twist to her gift:
Cassandra was doomed to tell the truth, but never to be believed.''''1 1 1. Evaluating FTA in the light of recent events This paper is based on a series of interviews with nine leading researchers.
The setting for the interviews was the Future-oriented technology analysis International Conference organised by the EU Joint research Centre Institute for Prospective Technology studies (IPTS) in Seville in October 2008.
Another pointed to the historical limitations of any attempt to Futures 43 (2011) 313 316 A r T I C L E I N F O Article history:
Available online 19 november 2010 A b s T R A c T This paper is based on a series of interviews with nine leading researchers conducted during the Future-oriented technology analysis International Conference held in Seville
on 16 17 october 2008. Analysis of these interviews paints a picture of FTA as an increasingly important approach being adopted in many countries to address the many challenges which are emerging at this time in human history.
as with Cassandra's prophecies. 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.§§This paper is based on interviews with nine leading FTA researchers conducted during the Future-oriented technology analysis International Conference held in Seville on October 16 17,2008.
The interviewees were selected on the basis of their long experience with FTA, and the variety of their experience and perspectives.
Faculty of engineering, University of Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia. Tel.:++61 02 9351 3934; fax:++61 02 9351 3974.
www. elsevier. com/locate/futures 0016-3287/$ see front matter 2010 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:
A significant feature of this era is the strange combination of more than ever long term challenges like climate change with the need for leaders to react in the very short-term conditions of a crisis''.More than ever,
''In this context, there is wide agreement that the two years since the 2006 International Seville FTA Conference had seen significant development in FTA capacity across many countries and regions:
We have moved from the spectacular mountains of individual foresight studies to the range of foothills of distributed and embedded foresight projects, less visible but probably far greater in volume''.
and evaluating the impact of fta has emerged as a major preoccupation for the field in recent years, with the recognition that demonstrating impact is probably the greatest hurdle to the wider acceptance and use of FTA.
A paper by Calof and Smith at the 2008 International Seville FTA Conference 3 concludesmethodology,
Hence, some FTA outputs may enter the reservoir of knowledge where it may be drawn on at some time in the future.
while you can always tell when a foresight program starts, it is more difficult to tell where it ends''.
'2 but there is also value in selecting topics that are likely to arouse strong interest. 3 The challenge for high impact FTA is to select issues that have both a long time horizon,
Changes to these deeply embedded standards and practices will require both time and continuing commitment.
R. Johnston, C. Cagnin/Futures 43 (2011) 313 316 314 The first FTA Conference in 2004 gathered predominantly the EU-US community together to take stock of the developments
and a special issue of Technological forecasting and Social Change 5. The second Conference in 2006 enlarged the geographical base of participants,
and Technology analysis & Strategic management 8. The large number of papers submitted in 2008 is an indication both of the central role the FTA Conference has come to play, principally for European researchers but also increasingly for researchers from around the world,
and talk up the latest FTA wares to those who may have need a to apply them. To this end, it is crucial in the future to design
and learn about the latest advances in and applications of FTA. This would suggest the need for continuing evolution of the format of the conference so as to engage policy-makers directly with issues in
The focus of two sessions of the 2008 FTA Conference on security and sustainability may be a useful first move in this direction.
and in all components of public and private decision-making. 4. Conclusions The interviews conducted as a component of the Future-oriented technology analysis International Conference held in Seville on 16 17 october 2008 provide a clear insight into the current state of the FTA
and may well resort to other guides to the future, or apply them (as we have seen with scenario planning) with little comprehension of their essential components.
and in supporting the linkage between the analysis of the interviews with the overall results of the 2008 FTA Conference.
R. Johnston, C. Cagnin/Futures 43 (2011) 313 316 315 Ricardo Seidl da Fonseca UNIDO, Austria.
Cursed Prophetess, 1998, accessed at http://www. arthistory. sbc. edu/imageswomen/papers/fittoncassandra/intro. html. 2 For example V. van Rij, Joint horizon scanning:
Future-oriented technology analysis International Conference, Seville, October, 2008, accessible at: http://forera. jrc. ec. europa. eu/fta 2008/prog day1. html. 4 F. Scapolo, E. Cahill, New horizons and challenges for future-oriented technology analysis, in:
New technology Foresight, Forecasting & Assessment Methods, 2004, European communities Technical Report EUR 21473 EN. 5 F. Scapolo, New horizons and challenges for future-oriented technology analysis:
The 2004 EU-US Seminar, Technological forecasting and Social Change 72 (9)( 2005. 6 Cagnin, et al.
impact on policy and decision making The 2006 FTA INTERNATIONAL SEVILLE SEMINAR, Technological forecasting and Social Change 75 (4)( 2008.
8 J. C. Harper, K. Cuhls, L. Georghiou, R. Johnston, Future-oriented technology analysis as a driver of strategy and policy, Technology analysis & Strategic management 20 (3)( 2008.
9 2008 FTA Conclusions written by the Conference's Scientific Committee available at: http://forera. jrc. ec. europa. eu/fta 2008/conclusions. html. 10 UK Foresight programme, Flood and Coastal Defence, 2004, http://www. foresight. gov
. uk/Ourwork/Completedprojects/Flood/index. asp. 11 UK Foresight programme, Tackling Obesities: Future Choices, 2007, http://www. foresight. gov. uk/Ourwork/Activeprojects/Obesity/Obesity. asp.
R. Johnston, C. Cagnin/Futures 43 (2011) 313 316 316
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