, University of Sydney, NSW 2006, Australia 3fabiana Scapolo, European commission Joint research Centre, Science Advice to Policy Unit, Brussels, Belgium*Corresponding author.
Mark. boden@ec. europa. eu. The Fourth International Seville Conference on Future-oriented technology analysis (FTA) held in May 2011, focussed on the need and potential of FTA to address disruptive transformations in global and national structures
Shaping and Driving Structural and Systematic Transformations organised by the Institute of Prospective Technological Studies of the European commission's Joint research Centre (JRC-IPTS) was held in May 2011.
adapt and respond pro-actively to change. 1 A closing summary of the FTA Conference outcomes in relation to policy needs by Georghiou (2011) highlighted the extent to which the global scale, complexity,
so that is what we will Science and Public policy 39 (2012) pp. 135 139 doi: 10.1093/scipol/scs026 The Author 2012.
Published by Oxford university Press. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals. permissions@oup. com do';‘
One particular feature of the 2011 FTA Conference was the organisation of two invitation-only sessions devoted to good practice in foresight for policy.
Time for the EU to meet global challenges'(Boden et al. 2010) to illustrate how horizon scanning can enable collective sense-making processes which assist in the identification of emerging signals and policy issues, the synthesis of such issues into encompassing clusters,
In 2010, global challenges were identified, analysed, restructured and selected according to potential Fraunhofer contributions and market potential.
Nehme, de Miranda Santos, Filho and Coelho provide a case study of the application of foresight by the Brazilian Center for Strategic Studies and Management (CGEE), over the past nine years.
References Boden, M.,Cagnin, C.,Carabias, V.,Haegeman, K. and Ko nno la, T. 2010)‘ Facing the future:
Time for the EU to meet global challenges',24364 EN, 6/2010. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European commission.
Georghiou, L. 2011)‘ Connecting conference outcomes with policy needs, options and implications'paper presented during final plenary session at the Fourth International Conference on Future-oriented technology analysis, held Seville, Spain
, 12 3 may 2011.<<http://foresight. jrc. ec. europa. eu/fta 2011/Programmeandpapers. htm>accessed March 2012.
The role of FTA in responding to grand challenges. 139
Challenges in communicating the outcomes of a foresight study to advise decision-makers on policy and strategy Claudio Chauke Nehme1, 2,,
and strengths (Coates, cited by Miles et al. 2008). Foresight seeks to provide a strategic perspective for the present, with knowledge of future possibilities, building commitment to and coordination on national or institutioona priorities.
Vecchiato and Roveda (2010) prefer to use the term‘strategic foresight'rather than the simpler‘foresight
Strategic foresight is defined by Slaughter (1999) as the ability to create and maintain a high-quality, coherent and functional forward view
It is defined by Habegger (2010) as a deliberate attempt to broaden the‘boundaries of perception
This paper discusses this decision-making environment and a relevant Brazilian Science and Public policy 39 (2012) pp. 245 257 doi:
10.1093/scipol/scs015 Advance Access published on 16 march 2012 The Author 2012. Published by Oxford university Press.
technological and innovation‘think tank'created in 2001. It has been qualified as a‘social organization'by the Brazilian Presidency,
From 2001 to the present, the CGEE has conducted nearly 400 strategic foresight exerciise and strategic evaluation studies, mobilizing more than 2000 experts per annum from an average of 300 institutions.
This paper addresses the following two key points: Firstly, we consider intangibles (see Section 2). An informal
and cannot be formalized as a deliverabbl (European commission 2011). Intangibles are deemed to be very important and foresight practitioners should pay heed to their generation as strategic foresight exercises develop.
It is important for everyone participating in a given foresight exercise to not be afraid to attempt new ways of thinking (Kelley and Littman, 2001.
there is the issue of the unpredictability of the future it is neither possible nor feasible to say how the future will be (De Geus 2002.
'This simply means that the synergy among them, the network articulation potentiial the intensity of the exchanges and the intrinsically democratic nature of the process benefit individuals and collectivity in more extensive ways than the results of the study themselves (European commission 2011.
as cited by Irwin (2004):.in a knowledge-based society, democratic governance must ensure that citizens are able to make an informed choice from the options made available to them by responsible scientific and technological progress.
In the last three years, CGEE has conducted some relevant national strategic foresight exercises, all involving ST&I policy,
3. The value of out-of-the-box thinking in a foresight exercise The concept of out-of-the-box thinking adopted in this paper is related to learning organization theory (Tosey 2005.
Brummer (2005: 156) The idea is thought a-oriented process aiming to make decisions or share perceptions, free from prejudice, cultural influence,
and common sense perspectives ingrained in the past (Hames 2010; Johnston 2010. In foresight exercises developed by CGEE, mind-set revision involves the participation of experts
and stakeholdders applying a variety set of methods and tools, and a suitable combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches.
and conducting foresight exerciise according to the CGEE's values and institutional mission (Santos et al. 2004).
It takes into account the methodological structures proposed by Horton (1999) and Conway and Voros (2002),
as well as practical orientattion contained in the Handbook of Knowledge society Foresight (Miles et al. 2002) and in Godet (2001).
2004) have coined the term technology futures analysis (TFA), which comprises technology intelligence, forecasting, roadmapping, technollog assessment, and foresight.
and Grupp 2001) This approach aims to link the present decisions and actions to a strategic perspective, coping with the possibilities of the future for the construction of commitmeent around national priorities for ST&I. 248.
Based on concepts developed by the EU (Santos and Santos 2003), foresight is considered to be an activity connecctin three different dimensions of the same process:
in informing the decision-making processes on ST&I (Santos et al. 2004). There are a number of key elements embedded in this methodological approach.
Firstly, and most important, stakeholders must be involved in the exercise from the very beginning (Eriksson and Weber 2008.
Secondly, systematically introducing collective intelligeenc throughout all the phases of the process is the key for achieving success (Glenn 2010.
which is also known as the Brazilian Innovation Agency (Coelho et al. 2011). The following items are presented:.A brief description of FINEP's context..
considering existing challenges to Brazilian energy matrix in next 20 years Technologies for generation of electric energy, fuel supply and energy transmission and distribution, distributed generaatio and storage, planning
and expand its current position as the main public innovation agency in Brazil, over the next 15 years.
Figure 2. Evolution of funding to FINEP, 2000 10.252. C. C. Nehme et al. 5. 1 Premises There were two basic assumptions:.
the Brazilian ST&I Plan of action (2007 10; the government's multi-year budget plan; the political changes that could affect it as a government-owned company. 5. 2 Future perspectives A tool the future timeline was developed
in order to help stakeholders'thinking oriented by the main ST&I drivers. The timeline tool was chosen as an alternative to the method of scenarios,
those who were able to perceive the signs certainly have a comparative advantage over others (Loveridge 2009).
Among the international contributions, Moorcroft's study (Moorcroft 2009) stands out. It presents an overview of trends
The four phases proposed for the development of the SMP (see Fig. 5) were defined to meet the needs of the process, taking into consideration FINEP's culture and experience in planning and management over the years.
2007) and Popper (2008. These authors have proposed a classification of methods and techniques by the type of approach (exploratory or normatiive) method (qualitative, semi-quantitative or quantitattive or source of knowledge (creativity, expertise, interaction or evidence.
focused on prospective vision and on the definition of strategic guidelines covering time horizons of 5, 10 and 15 years..
regarrdin what is envisaged in the literature (European commission 2011:.The creation, expansion, mobilization and maintenance of networks, are considered often as important as the tangible results, such as reports or recommendations..
>References Brummer, H. L. 2005)‘ A dynamic competitive analysis model for global mining firms',Doctor of commerce thesis, University of South africa.
2011)‘ Strategic foresight applied to the management plan of an innovation development agency',Technology analysis & Strategic management, 24: 267 83.
Conway, M. and Voros, J. 2002)‘ Implementing organisational foresight: a case study in learning from the future',paper presented at International Conference Probing the Future:
Developing Organisational Foresight in the Knowledge Economy, held Glasgow, Scotland, 11 3 july 2002. Cuhls, K. and Grupp, H. 2001)‘ Alemanha:
abordagens prospectivas nacionais',Parcerias Estrate'gicas, 10:76 104. De Geus, A. 2002) Tools for Foresight:
Planning for the Unpredictable Future. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business Press. Eriksson, E. A. and Weber, K. M. 2008)‘ Adaptive foresight:
navigating the complex landscape of policy strategies',Technological forecasting and Social Change, 75: 462 82. European commission, Joint research Centre, Institute for Prospective Technological Studies.
2011)‘ The FOR-LEARN Online foresight Guide, '<http://forlearn. jrc. ec. europa. eu/guide/0 home/index. htm>accessed 12 december 2011.
Glenn, J. C. 2010)‘ Collective Intelligence: one of the next big things'.'In: Wagner, C. G. ed.)Worldfuture 2010:
256. C. C. Nehme et al. Sustainable futures, Strategies, and Technologies. Bethesda, MD: World Future Society. Godet, M. 2001) Creating Futures Scenario planning as a Strategic management Tool.
Washington: Economica. Habegger, B. 2010)‘ Strategic foresight in public policy: reviewiin the experiences of the UK, Singapore and The netherlands',Futures, 42:49 58.
Hames, R. D. 2010)‘ New windows into new worlds: The case for integral foresight',paper presented at Foresight International Seminar:
From Theory to Practice, Brasilia, Brazil, 16 7 december 2010. Horton, A. 1999)‘ Forefront: a simple guide to successful foresigght'Foresight:
the Journal of Future Studies, 1: 5 9. Irwin, A. 2004)‘ Expertise and experience in the governance of science:
what is public participation for?''III Semina'rio Internacional de Estudos Interdisciplinares, Floriano'polis, Brazil.
Johnston, R. 2010)‘ Methods and tools for breaking mindsets and bringing new perspectives to the table',paper presented at Foresight International Seminar:
From Theory to Practice, Brasilia, Brazil, 16 7 december 2010. Jouvenel, B. 1967) The Art of Conjecture.
New york: Basic books. Kelley, T. and Littman, J. 2001) The Art of Innovation. New york: Currency/Doubleday.
Miles, I.,Harper, J. C.,Georgiou, L.,Keenan, M. and Popper, R. 2008)‘ The many faces of foresight'.
'In: Georgiou, L.,Harper, J. C.,Keenan, M.,Miles, I. and Popper, R. eds) The Handbook of Technology foresight:
Concepts and Practice, pp. 3 23. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. Miles, I.,Keenan, M. and Kaivo-Oja, J. 2002) Handbook of Knowledge society Foresight.
Manchester: Prest. Moorcroft, S. 2009) Trends Affecting Innovation policies, and Promotion. London: Shaping Tomorrow. Popper, R. 2008)‘ Foresight methodology'.
'In: Georgiou, L.,Harper, J. C.,Keenan, M.,Miles, I. and Popper, R. eds) The Handbook of Technology foresight:
Concepts and Practice, pp. 44 88. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. Porter, A l.,Ashton, W. B.,Clar, G.,Coates, J. F. et al.
2004)‘ Technology futures analysis: towards integration of the field and new methods',Technological forecasting and Social Change, 71: 287 303.
2004)‘ Prospecc¸a o em cie ncia, tecnologia e inovac¸a o: a abordagem conceitual e metodolo'gica do Centro de Gesta o e Estudos Estrate'gicos e sua aplicac¸a o para os setores
Slaughter, R. A. 1999) Futures for the Third Millennium: Enabling the Forward View. Sydney: Prospect Media.
Tosey, P. 2005)‘ The hunting of the learning organization: A paradoxical journey',Management Learning, 36: 335 52.
Vecchiato, R. and Roveda, C. 2010)‘ Foresight in corporate organizations',Technology analysis & Strategic management, 22:99 112.
liuli66@tsinghua. edu. cn Few countries have increased their expenditure on r&d as rapidly as has China in recent years.
China, science policy, research, innovation. 1. Introduction and problem definition In recent years, there has been a rapidly growing interest in the development of science, technology and innovation (STI) in the People's republic of china.
So far, scholarly interest has focused on the overall evolution and design of China's science and technology (S&t system (Ke 2004;
Gu and Lundvall 2006; Mu and Qu 2008; Simon and Goldman 1989; Saich 1989; Suttmeier 1980;
Wan 2008; Wang 1993), selected sectors and actors (Jakobson 2007; Zhang et al. 2009) or assessment of the state of its STI capabilities (D'Costa and Parayil 2009;
Hu and Mathews 2008; Jakobson 2007; Lv 2007; OECD 2008; Zhou and Leydesdorff 2006. Surprisingly little attention has been paid,
however, to how decisions are taken and priorities set in Chinese S&t policy (see, however, the primarily quantitative policy analysis in Liu et al.
2011)).)) We aim to remedy this by studying the processes and interests shaping the priorities in China's R&d programs and policies.
The choice of China may be motivated by its sheer importtanc in the world scientific system, where it is quickly moving from laggard to leader.
The question remains how that transformation is related to policy practice, that is, how deeply the quantitative transformation of resource inputs has affected the design of the policy process.
We argue that such a transformation of policy models is also underway, blending the traditional focus on large-scale missions with a pluralist funding of individual projects and scientific institutions,
without strings attached to policy-oriented programs. Pluralism and elitism thus exist side by side. In this sense, the outline of a Chinese research policy model is therefore indicative of a more general policy change in China.
The emergence of a new priority-setting model has been driven by growing internal criticism of what are described as cumbersome and opaque allocation models.
In an article in People's Daily in August 2010, prominent academmic complained that the current S&t system is overfunnde but institutionally weak (Zhao et al. 2010.
Science and Public policy 39 (2012) pp. 258 270 doi: 10.1093/scipol/scs006 Advance Access published on 17 february 2012 The Author 2012.
Published by Oxford university Press. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals. permissions@oup. com Similarly, in an editorial in Science, Shi and Rao (2010) argue that bureaucrats misuse
or abuse the terms‘national needs 'and‘expert opinions'to justify allocating research funding on grounds other than scientific excellence.
As a result, they argue, the system for allocating funding is suscepttibl to various forms of rent-seeking and even corruptiio in lieu of transparent decision-making mechanisms.
They claim that the current research system‘wastes resourrces corrupts the spirit and stymies innovation'(Shi and Rao 2010.
Such criticisms highlight a fundamental debate in Chinese science policy-making as to how research funding should be allocated
and how research priorities should be set. That is, whether the massive spikes in public resources should be transmitted to universities and research councils,
or whether they should be distributed through large-scale national programs, and which of these models may be suited best to fulfill the goal of making China a global scientific superpoowe (see also Hao 2008).
Critics of Chinese science policy-making portray it as strong on formulating high-level objectives but weak on building long-term capacity from below,
Greenhalgh 2008. Thus, China can be categorized clearly as a top-down and centralized planning system, which focuses on large-scale accomplishments and numerical accomplishments, with a preference for grandiose plans.
'This indicates that China is not moving towards a substitution of centralized reseaarc governance with a fully fledged pluralist system without strong coordinating mechanisms a`la Russia after the Soviet period (Graham and Dezhina 2008.
Braun 2008 on Europe; Block and Keller 2011 on the USA. Instead, China seems to be forging its own way with an evolving mixture of planning, decentralization and deliberation. 1. 1 Trends in setting priorities Explicit models for science policy priority-setting devellope late and with great tensions.
In his classic paper Weinberg (1963) formulated what later became a dominant mechanism for priority-setting in science policy in Western countries:
With the tougher fiscal climate of the 1960s and 1970s and the rise of several political challenges, a new steering model emerged where political priorities invaded the decisionmakkin process more explicitly (Elzinga 1985.
since been enmeshed with policies in other areas, reducing the professional autonomy of the scientific community in setting priorities (Ziman 1994).
and public accountabillity and where public academic and government research institutions are expected to draw upon private resources (OECD 2003).
but not always, under the coordinating umbrella of public research planning (Ruivo 1994). Today's mechanism for priority-setting in these countries is therefore a hybrid, sometimes drawing upon scientific expertise not only in low-level decision-making but also in the framing of societal challenges underlying science policy priorities (Pielke 2007),
while at the same time devising and implementing mechanisms by which science can be put to productive use
and where broader societal considerations inform priority-setting (Laredo and Mustar 2001; Braun 2008. 1. 2 Analytical assumptions On the basis of this discussion, we argue that research priority-setting may take the following (not mutually exclussive directions:
diffusion-oriented, mission-oriented, excellence-oriented, and oriented toward capability building. Ergas (1987) identifies two principal orientations of countries'technology policy:
diffusion-and missionorienttation While Ergas'categorization is useful, it needs to be complemented with two more dimensions.
Cantner and Pyke 2000. The second is related to institutiionand capacity-building and governance of the S&t system,
and other attempts to classify technollog policy (Cantner and Pyke 2000; Foray 2000) have focused generally on economically advanced countries
and thus presuppose relatively well-developed and mature S&t institutions, basic capacities and governance mechanisms.
in modern times it has lagged behind Western countries in S&t (Ke 2004). Beginning with the founding of People's republic of china in 1949, a Socialist centralized S&t system was built in the 1950s by adding the Soviet model of centralized planning onto the S&t system that had emerged in the Republic of china (e g.
Wang 1993; Simon and Goldman 1989. Five S&t‘forces'or actors were identified: the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), the public research institutes affiliated to the ministries,
the public research institutes affiliated to the provincial governments, the universities and the national defense research institutes.
These actors operated on the basis of a clear division of labor with little interaction between them.
and the man-made satellite (Suttmeier 1989). After the end of the Cultural Revolution, the direction of China's development policy,
and with it its S&t policy, changed radically (Gu and Lundvall 2006; Simon and Goldman 1989),
and can be summarized in four major phases since 1978: experimentation, structural reforms, deepening and the firm-centered phase (OECD 2008)( see Fig. 1). The 1978 National science Conference coincided with the launch of the economic reform
and open-door policy and was watershed an important event for S&t in China. At the opening ceremony, then-Premier Deng xiaoping Figure 1. Phases in Chinese S&t policy making.
OECD (2008: 72). 260. M. Benner et al. declared that S&t were‘the productive force'rather than an ideological category,
a modest connection between research and commercialization (for analyses of the transition see Feigenbaum 2003;
Saich 1989; Suttmeier 1980. The next phase, of structural reforms, began in the mid-1980s, when the China Communist party Central Committee (CCPCC) issued policy documents outlining three major systems reforms:
of the economic system in 1984, of the S&t system in 1985, and of the education system in 1985.
The latter reforms focused primarily on the funding system, pushing scientists to seek funding from the market
while launching the National Natural science Foundation of China (NSFC) and national S&t programs for researchers to apply to on a competitive base.
The 1985 reform has been described as:..‘highly systemic'in the sense that the focus was on reshaping the division of labor and the interaction between producers and users of knowledge and innovation.
Gu and Lundvall 2006: 15) The next phase, of deepening, occurred with the 14th Congress of the CCPCC (in 1992),
which explicitly proposed to establish the Socialist market economy system. A decision on accelerating the progress of S&t was launched in 1995,
proposing a national strategy entitled‘strategy of revitalizing the nation through science and education'(kejiao xingguo).
The decision on‘acceleration of progress in S&t'marked a further step towards orienting S&t towards China's social and economic needs
and towards linking STI efforts more closely with market forces and the private sector (US Embassy Beijing 1996).
Wen 2008. 2. 2 Governance of the S&t system An important element characterizing the governance of China's S&t system throughout the phases identified before is the strong involvement of China's top leaders in S&t decision-making.
Technology and Education of the State Council, created in 1998, and currently chaired by Prime minister Wen Jiabao.
The Ministry of S&t (MOST) plays a key role both through its responsibility for formulating S&t policy for example in the Medium and Long-term Plan and in the five-year plans for S&t development and as a key dispenser of research funds (Springut et al. 2011.
2010)).)) Priority-setting in Chinese research policies and programs operates on different levels. The first level concerns ideology and overarching national strategy.
priorities are set within the framework of long-term (and five-year) plans, and medium-and long-term plans for S&t (MLP).
The latest MLP was presented in February 2006 and lasts until 2020. It proposed guidelines which are expressed in 16 Chinese characters:
indigenous innovation (zizhu chuangxin), leapfrogging in key areas (zhongdian kuayue), supporting economic and social development (zhicheng fazhan), leading the future (yinling weilai).
'and‘basic research'(Cao et al. 2006; Schwaag Serger and Breidne 2007. So-called mega-engineering and mega-science projects are aimed at‘leapfrogging'in key areas,
while key technology programs play the role of supporting economic development, oriented to priority fields and themes identified in the MLP.
1 The most salient programs in recent history are the National Key technologies R&d Program established in 1984,
the State High-tech R&d Program (also known as the 863 Program), initiated in 1986 and the State Basic R&d Program (also known as the 973 Program), established in 1997.
The 863 Program serves the goal of‘leading to the future'by supporting the development of frontier technologies.
with the former guiding and providing an overarching framework for the latter (in their five-year plans).
but also on the allocation of resources into mission-driven activities (see Table 2). 4 Table 1. China's R&d programs Program Starting year Objective 6th Five-year
Plan National Key technologies R&d Program 1984 Foster key technologies to upgrade traditional industries and create new ones State Key Laboratory Program 1984 Support selected laboratories in universities,
public research institutes and firms 7th Five-year Plan Creation of NSFC, 1986 National High-technology R&d Program (863 Program) 1986 Foster China's overall innovation capacity in high-tech sectors and enhance its international competitiveness Spark Program 1986
Support technology transfer to rural areas and promote development of agriculture based on S&t achievements State Key and New Product Program 1988 Support new high-tech products for key industries 9th Five-year Plan National Program
on Key Basic research Priorities (973 Program) 1997 Support basic research Innovation Fund for Technology-based SMES 1999 Support innovative activity by high-tech SMES Special
Technology development Project for Research institutes 1999 Support central government-related technology development research institutes Action Plan for Thriving Trade by Science and Technology 2000 Facilitate exports of high-tech products
with high value-added and foster international competitiveness 10th Five-Year Plan Agriculture S&t Transfer Fund 2001 Foster development of S&t achievements in agriculture
and diffusiio of agricultural technologies 11th Five-Year Plan Mega-science Program 2006 Promote four top scientific areas Mega-engineering Projects 2006 Promote technology
and engineering projects with highly strategic national goals Date of creation unknown International S&t Cooperation Plan 2001?
Use global S&t resources to develop critical technologies; provide a platform for international cooperation State Engineering Technology research Centers Provide technologies
and equipment to firms Soft Science Research program Provide reliable scientific advice to national and local policy-makers Source:
OECD (2008) and MOST website (see Note 2). 262. M. Benner et al. 3. Setting priorities:
based on data on national S&t programs provided in the China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology (2009).
2009 China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology Data from 2008. Note: In order to simplify, some programs have been grouped into one‘bubble'.
'Thus, the‘Innofund+programs'includes Innofund, Spark, Torch, Agricultural S&t Transfer Fund, National Engineering research Centers (data from 2007) and the New National Products Program.
Table 3. Allocations for S&t by Central Government in main S&t programs (in million RMB) Item 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
1648 1900 National High-tech R&d Program (863 Program)* 2974 3768 4025 3795 4440 5592 Key technology R&d Program 1053 1338 1345
130 130 134 216 1600 1605 Source: All data for programs, except data for 863 Program,
MOST (2009)( see Note 2) and China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology (2009).**Data for 863 Program are from MOST (2009)( see Note 2),
China Science and Technology indicators (2008) and from<http://www. sts. org. cn>accessed 20 may 2011.264.
M. Benner et al. One principal program, the Mega-engineering Projects is missing due to lack of data.
Created in the 10th Five-year Plan, its major goal is to address pressing S&t issues for national economic and social development. 5 Finally,
founded in 1986, which was inspired strongly by the US National science Foundation. The NSFC was a product of the official reform of the S&t system
which started in 1985. It is a public institution directly under the State Council and its financial resources come mainly from allocations by the Central Government,
In recent years, we have seen an increasing orientation by the NSFC towards funding economic and socially relevant research
the Case 973 Program (in million RMB) Item 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 Total 589 686 800 897 983
1354 1648 1900 Agriculture science 100 86 84 105 109 111 145 170 Energy science 77 68 90 84 95
MOST (see Note 2) and China Statistical Yearbook on Science and Technology (2009). Research priority setting in China. 265 the ideal of planning also shapes and influences programs for excellence.
‘Over 10 billion Yuan to be invested in 211 Project',26 march 2008). 6 3. 4 Diffusion The‘Torch'and‘Spark'Programs are clear-cut examples of diffusion-oriented measures,
products and services suffers from several institutional shortcomings and weaknesses, both with regard to bank lending and venture capital funding (Fuller 2009;
White et al. 2005. As a result, there is a severe shortage of innovation funding, particulaarl for private firms and for SMES (The Economist 2009;
2011), further accentuating the bias against diffusion in the S&t programs. 3. 5 Institution-and capacity-building Several programs aim at building and strengthening China's emerging institutions and capacities.
Within the S&t programs, the most obvious are the National S&t Infrastructure Fund and the NSFC Fund for less developed regions.
amounting to 6%of the total number of universities in 2008 (People's Daily, ‘Over 10 billion Yuan to be invested in 211 Project'26 march 2008).
7 Similarly, the purpose of the 985 Program, established in 1998, is to strengthen China's higher education system by funding around 40 universities out of a total of around 2, 000 regular institutions of higher education in China (Marginson 2006).
A further indication of the‘bipolar'nature of China's university system is that the top nine universities,
or less than 0. 5%of the total number of universities, account for around a quarter of all Chinese scientific publications and citations (Springut et al. 2011).
The Knowledge Innovation Program (KIP) launched in 1998 by the CAS is expected to result in a select group of research institutes
which strengthen China's S&t system by conducting world-class research, transferring research results to industry, providing S&t policy advice,
again reinforcing the focus on missions rather than institutional development (Suttmeier et al. 2006). Overall, institution-and capacity-building have received much less attention and focus than mission or excellence as priorities
and Lundvall (2006) who argue that the investments in S&t have not been supported sufficiently by institutional development.
The five-year plans are the most obvious and structured tool of China's economic planning process in the sense that that it is clear to everyone
The mediumaan long-term plans are not as strictly regulated as the five-year plans since their time span has varied over the range 8 15 years.
The national S&t programs, such as the 863 Program, the 973 Program or the KIP, are created outside the temporal planning cycle in response to problems
In March 1986 Deng xiaoping personally approved the drafting of a National High-tech R&d Program, the 863 Program.
From April through September of 1986, the State Council mobilized hundreds of experts to draft an Outline for Development Of high Technology
is considered widely to have been the response by then-Premier Li peng to concerns voiced by scientists at the Political Consultation Conference (zhengxie) in March 1997 that basic research was being neglected in S&t funding.
which are implemennte outside the five-year or medium-and long-term planning cycle, the original impetus can be argued to have come from scientists,
Thus, in the making of the latest Medium and Long-term Plan, an‘expert consulttatio group for the overall strategy for the Mediumaan Long-term Plan'consisting of around 20 senior scienttist was created in 2003 to provide input to the‘leading group'which was made up of the Prime minister
and top officials from 23 ministries and ministry-level organizatiion (Liu 2009; Schwaag Serger and Breidne 2007.
These two groups were responsible for identifying key S&t issues relevant for the next medium-and long-term plan.
In addition to the domestic process, workshops were held with international experts at the Multi-S&t Minister Forum in Shenzhen in October 2003,
and an‘International Forum for MLP making'was organized in November 2003 in Beijing. In April 2004, the interim strategic research reports were sent to CAS, CAE,
and the Chinese Academy of Social sciences for consultation. The final results were presented then to Premier Wen Jiabao.
which lasted approximately one year, were open to the public. The planning process was surrounded by relatively public and heated debates concerning the fundamental choice of development strategy to be pursued in the plan (see also Gu and Lundvall 2006.
The MOST propagated the idea that China should pursue the idea of‘indigenous innovation 'or‘homegrown innovation'and strive to reduce China's dependence on foreign Technology research priority setting in China. 267 (Mei and Luo 2005).
In contrast, some economists, such as Justin Yifu Lin, argued that the country should continue to rely on China's comparative advantages (Lin et al. 2003.
A related debate centered on the impact of foreign direct investment, which had been encouraged strongly by Chinese official policy,
with MOST expressing skepticism (Mei and Luo 2005). During 2005, officials involved in the drafting sought input from foreign experts
and diplomats on how they viewed the term‘indigenous innovation'(zizhu chuangxin). Overall, the processes surrounding priority-setting in China's national S&t programs are characterized by formal and elaborate processes with an emphasis on input by scientific experts,
The massive infusion of resources in recent years has been driven by a combination of motives: cultivating universities with global recognition,
and 2005 decisions and plans to strengthen the S&t infrastructure, linking investments in S&t to broader societal goals
with mediumaan long-term plans serving as umbrellas for sub-level planning exercises (five-year plans).
will play out in the future is a key issue for students of Chinese politics in the years to come.
Notes 1. For more information about programs, see OECD (2008: Chap. 11). 2. For more information on the 863 and 973 Programs,
See OECD (2008: 459). 4. Some suggestions about the reform of the national S&t programs management (guanyu guojia keji jihua guangli gaige de ruogan yijian),<www. most. gov
Wu Y.‘Three suggestions to improve China's S&t policy',Guangming Daily, 14 may 2007, <http://www. gmw. cn/01gmrb/2007-05/14/content 605455. htm>accessed 20 may 2011.9.
The website was<http://gh. most. gov. cn>.>A key official and policy-maker of the MOST reported that more than 3, 000 people had registered at the website
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