Cryptology (11) | ![]() |
Homomorphic encryption (5) | ![]() |
G#1v 6927 Cryptology G#2v 6928 Cryptology 0#3#cryptographic key Cryptology 0#3#cryptologist Cryptology
0#3#cryptology Cryptology G#2v 6929 Homomorphic encryption 0#3#homomorphic encryption Homomorphic encryption G#1v 7764 Data
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G#3v 7774 Memory G#4v 7775 Memory chip 0#5#memory chip Memory chip G#4v 7776 Memory device
to the publisher's cryptographic key Security Design for an Inter-Domain Publish/Subscribe Architecture 175
representing, for instance, agents, request numbers, or cryptographic keys) into ï nitely many equivalence classes and to compute on those equivalence classes
Sensitive cryptographic keys, stored inside the token, should not be revealed to the outside and it should be impossible for an attacker to change those keys
designed schemes such as homomorphic encryption 9 that allow veriï able com -putation on encrypted data. However, the proposed schemes are too ineï cient
Fully homomorphic encryption using ideal lattices. In: Pro -ceedings of the 41st annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
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