Received 14 may 2011 Accepted 18 september 2012 Available online 28 november 2012 This paper reflects on the potential of future-oriented analysis (FTA) to address major change
this paper discusses the potential of future-oriented analysis (FTA) to address major change and to support decision-makers
and understood in order to allow one to be prepared better for the future and/or shape it
in order to realise a favourable future state. Transformations can occur as a result of disruptive events (i e. unexpected, short-term and sudden events, with immediate and ongoing impacts, for
Current and future economic, environmental and societal challenges, as well as their combination emerge from such transformations
Rather, it is a set of various approaches to the future, which share some assumptions,
and the present in order to consider future options or predict the future. Besides scientific methods, various other techniques are used also.
The main objective of FTA projects is to assist decision-makers with relevant analyses, observations and new ideas to be prepared better for the future (assuming that it can be predicted)
or shape the future (assuming that it is predetermined not fully by the identified/identifiable trends).
In other words, while FTA ACTIVITIES generate new knowledge, actually both practical and scientific knowledge, these are not scientific projects per se.
Both Hamarat et al. 11 and Kwakkel and Pruit 12 apply an approach to forecasting that uses an ensemble of different models to explore a multiplicity of plausible futures (Exploratory Modelling
De Smedt et al. 5 investigate ways in which futures thinking assisted by scenarios can be used as a tool for inspiring actions and structures that address the grand challenges and for orienting innovation systems.
Shaper-Rinkel 13 analyses future-oriented governance of emerging technologies in the USA and in Germany,
and QT approaches does lead not only to a richer analysis of possible futures, but also to a wider view on possible directions of future developments.
Based on this conviction they propose several ways to support deeper integration of QL and QT approaches:(
The right understanding where a certain technology is in its TLC is important to estimate its future development,
and future research should take this into account to test the validity of the proposed model.
and it deals with uncertainties by using an ensemble of different models to explore a multiplicity of plausible futures (or scenarios.
Policy options across the future world ensemble are calculated and compared in an iterated process until the suggested policy provides satisfying results.
and iii) development of dynamic and adaptive plans and policies that are adequate across the multiplicity of plausible futures.
Finally, future research avenues include elaborating on the use of EMA for designing dynamic adaptive policies and the use of EMA for scenario discovery,
which future thinking can be used as a tool for inspiring actions. It does so by analysing seventeen scenario-based projects to identify elements of good practices
Therefore, scenarios stimulate future-oriented thinking, create a common language and understanding between stakeholders thus supporting a systematic negotiation process,
Hence, principles on how to orient innovation systems through future scenarios require representation and collaboration as well as the integration of different modes of future thinking
which include the possible and not only probable or desired futures. Shaper-Rinkel 13 analyses future-oriented governance of emerging technologies.
She explores the role that different types of FTA played in the development of nanotechnology governance in the USA and in Germany.
In Germany, FTA is used mainly for addressing the future of existing areas of strength with FTA ACTIVITIES being governed by one ministry (BMBF),
In both countries, early FTA envisioned innovative future nanotechnologies, but did not support guidance either for future innovative governance or for using nanotechnology for disruptive innovation in order to address grand societal challenges.
Comparing these two countries, the main difference lies in the existence of an umbrella organisation in the USA that pools heterogeneous stakeholders
Hence, the implication for future emerging technologies is that the methodology and practice of FTA should consider the governance dimension from the beginning by acknowledging that monitoring
Schirrmeister and Warnke 14 contribute towards building foresight capacities for systemic and structural transformations by sharing their experience on a project that explores future innovation patterns.
These contributed in a specific way to opening up new perspectives on the future of innovation and potential structural transformation of innovation processes,
5 P. De Smedt, K. Borch, T. Fuller, Future scenarios to inspire innovation, Technol. Forecast. Soc.
Public policy 39 (2012) 140 152.10 M. Boden, C. Cagnin, V. Carabias, K. Haegeman, T. Konnola, Facing the Future:
14 E. Schirrmeister, P. Warnke, Envisioning structural transformation lessons from a foresight project on the future of innovation, Technol.
the journal of future studies, strategic thinking and policy. His research activity has been focused mostly upon long-term policy
and shape the future from different methodological perspectives. Whilst the community has grown since the first edition of the International Seville Conference on Future-oriented technology analysis (FTA), there is still little dialogue
on the grounds that quantitative extrapolation from past data is not sufficient to address the uncertainties of the future
and share their views on this topic at future FTA conferences. 2. Sense or nonsense of applying qualitative
A further point to keep in mind is that numbers may create the impression that the future is less uncertain than it actually is. 3 In this respect Linstone 12,13 points out that the possibilities of forecasting may be limited especially when the dynamic,
the 2011 FTA Scientific Committee argued that the exclusive use of qualitative methods can lead to partial views on possible futures,
and assumptions 19,20 and does not tell us much about the future. Similarly, Loveridge and Saritas 20 point out that we simply cannot know the future.
They see FTA (both quantitative and 1 The interested reader is referred to Scapolo and Cahill 1 for further details on the origin and definition of the acronym FTA. 2 Quantitative participatory methods could for instance relate to the online sharing of big amounts of data,
in order to identify truly alternative future developments and to enhance our capacity to live in an unpredictable world 14,20, 21.
who see FTA EXERCISES as attempts to collect knowledge about‘posits'or possible futures, their plausibility and limits, their internal consistency and conformity with models and data, their consistency with expert judgement,
In the NEEDS project (www. needs-project. org), the acceptability of future energy technology options was submitted to a multi-criteria assessment involving a panel of stakeholders, the results
and to aggregate results into a broad view of what the future might entail. 6 Yet,
where the future is the object of analysis, as there are different ways of exploring the future, based on e g. differences in beliefs or educational backgrounds.
Still today the different FTA COMMUNITIES are perceived as rather competing than collaborating in exploring the future.
In the context of qualitative and quantitative techniques especially the marrying of quantitative modelling and foresight seems to be unexplored rather.
or predict the future seems to be contradicting the idea of developing multiple futures and shaping the future by identifying common directions to follow,
using foresight. In reality, predicting certain elements of a broader system such as demographic developments is not in contradiction in any way with developing multiple futures.
In Section 2 we pointed to the need to understand the opportunities that different methodologies can offer in collecting knowledge about possible futures 22.
However, understanding these opportunities does not seem straightforward. The shortage of examples of full methodological integration (as shown in Section 3 may also reflect deeply ingrained cultural differences hindering good communication between different epistemological communities.
as an output, informed estimates about the future. The latter, in the case of quantitative models, take the form of numbers with associated probability distributions
This means that both quantitative and qualitative tools and techniques should be judged not so much against the accuracy of their prediction on the future
Second, when FTA and especially foresight is addressing the intrinsically uncertain challenge of devising possible futures,
on the actions of those who will forge the future, largely reflecting their individual and collective (evolving) preferences.
which aim at eliciting information on the hypothetical dynamics of future preferences (individual and collective).
The appraisal of the expected future performance (and the ranking) of alternative technological options therefore explicitly incorporates information that inherently reflects the subjectivity of social players,
Future research could take up this endeavour. Fig. 1. Epistemology-skills-trust cycle. 392 K. Haegeman et al./
On the other hand, policy-makers and stakeholders will contribute to shaping the future through their decisions and their actions.
The exploration of future possibilities, when the expertise and knowledge made available by stakeholders and experts in the specific sector (s) subject to FTA can contribute to significantly increasing the quality of FTA results.
and not in terms of the probability that an envisioned future eventually comes true. In turn, uncertainty should be assessedwith the primary aim of differentiating between the intrinsic variability of a given phenomenon that exhibits high sensitivity to small changes (e g. networks congestion)
An exception is the International Futures Model, which can be used to examine long-term and interacting global development issues 73.393 K. Haegeman et al./
when referred to long-term, unverifiable representations of possible futures. Past performance is considered commonly as the most useful indication on which to build credibility and trust.
For forecast exercises, past performance can be validated by comparing predictions to reality. 16 Foresight on the other hand does not claim to predict the future
recommended future state has been realised is not meaningful. Good practices should rather be sought by measuring, if at all possible, the benefits derived from the foresight process itself (such as for instance network building and improved collaboration) and the improvement of the decision-making process,
both quantitative and qualitative tools aim at better understanding possible futures and reducing uncertainty and ignorance.
and managed in order to better shape the future and prepare various actors for it. In this context, combining methodological approaches creates opportunities to complement the weaknesses inherent to the use of one single approach with strengths of other approaches.
Online 5 (1)( 2010) 56 71.7 M. Cooke, N. Buckley, Web 2. 0, social networks and the future of market research, Int. J. Mark.
a knowledge-based perspective, Futures 43 (2011) 265 278.23 For-Learn, Online foresight guide, European foresight platform.
http://www. dodccrp. org/events/12th iccrts/CD/html/papers/053. pdf. Accessed July 2012.41 A. Soojung-Kim Pang, Future 2. 0:
and other world regions navigate into the future, in: EUR 24041 EN, European commission, Directorate-General for Research, Socioeconomic Sciences and Humanities, 2009, Available at:
Manage. 20 (3)( 2008) 369 387.73 B b. Hughes, P. D. Johnston, Sustainable futures: building policy options into a scenario for development in a global knowledge society, Futures 37 (2005) 813 831.74 R. Johnston, Developing the capacity to assess the impact of foresight, Foresight 14 (1
)( 2012) 56 68.75 H. White, Combining quantitative and qualitative approaches in poverty analysis, World Dev. 30 (3)( 2002) 511 522.76 C. Ansell, A. Gash
which may affect future European public policies by applying horizon scanning and foresight. She has worked in several foresight projects mainly in the advancement of the application of foresight as an instrument for policy-making formulation.
Received 14 may 2011 Received in revised form 22 june 2012 Accepted 23 august 2012 Available online 28 november 2012 To estimate the future development of one technology
in order to estimate future development trends to make informed decisions on whether to invest in it or not.
and fitting of growth models to project possible future trends 5. Most trend projection is naïve i e.,
, fitting a curve to the historical data under the assumption that whatever forces are collectively driving the trend will continue into the future unabated.
It follows that such projection becomes increasingly precarious as the future horizon is extended beyond a few years.
The U s. military, especially the Air force, has made use of this categorization of technology development to help identify current status and future prospects.
and hope that would help decision makers estimate its future development trends. 2. Methodology The model that we build to calculate the TLC for an object technology includes the following steps:
Future research should also take this into account. Third, the classifier we used in this paper is the nearest neighbour classifier.
For future study, we will test some other classifiers, such as nearest feature line (NFL) and Bayesian classifier, to assess
Futures research methodology Version 3. 0.,Millennium Project, WFUNA, WASHINGTON DC, 2009, Chapter 8. 35 E t. Popper, B. D. Buskirk, Technology life cycles in industrial markets, Ind.
to assessing future technological impacts, Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change 79 (1)( 2012) 16 29.40 A l. Porter, Technology foresight:
and proposed a research agenda for future research. But these authors have not considered in detail the new capabilities
As a first step toward a research agenda for future development of TFA I propose the realization of an international seminar in this field (Evolutionary theory of technological change) bringing together specialists in evolutionary model building and digital Darwinism to discuss the existing approaches
References 1 TFA Methods Working group, Technology futures analysis: toward integration of the fields and new methods, Technol.
Predicting the future: lessons from evolutionary theory, Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change 62 (1999) 51 62.4 T. L. Brown, Making Truth:
Society's Telltale Signature Reveals the Past and Forecasts the Future, Simon and Scuster, New york, 1992.12 T. Devezas, J. Corredine, The biological determinants of long-wave behavior in socioeconomic
an inability to grapple with the long-term's multiplicity of plausible futures. Modeling used for policy-making under uncertainty long faced the same inability to grapple with the long-term's multiplicity of plausible futures.
Although testing parametric uncertainty is a standard practice in modeling, and the importance to present a spectrum of runs under very different hypotheses covering the range of their variation was recognized decades ago 14, p. 149,
(1) the appropriate conceptual models which describe the relationships among the key driving forces that shape the long-term future,(
This approach thus explicitly uses the multiplicity of plausible futures for policy design, addressing one of the shortcomings of many traditional approaches and practices,
i e. the poor utilization of the potential to be prepared for uncertainties and surprises of future developments 18.
The systemic characteristic of the proposed approach enables a holistic and systemic exploration of the future
and many aspects related to these systems and their future developments are deeply uncertain. Current attempts at steering the transition toward a more sustainable and cleaner configuration are static
and may not be very effective and efficient in various futures, i e. they may not be robust.
The resulting policy is flexible and adaptive to the future as it unfolds. 409 C. Hamarat et al./
and the goals for future development are specified. In Step II, the way in which this is to be achieved is defined.
In order to achieve a sustainable future, there is a strong need for a transition in many domains, including transportation, housing, water and energy 46.
Here, the goal should be to aim for plans that are adequate across the multiplicity of plausible future worlds.
This paper shows a way in which EMA can be utilized to support the iterative development and refinement of adaptive policies in light of a clear exploration of the multiplicity of plausible futures.
has been illustrated through a case about the structural and systemic transformation of energy generation systems toward a more sustainable future.
In addition, all the extant forecasting methods contain fundamentalweaknesses and struggle deeply in grapplingwith the long-term'smultiplicity of plausible futures.
despite the presence of awide variety of quite distinct uncertainties and a multiplicity of plausible futures.
Techniques and Applications, Adison-Wesley, 1975.11 O. Saritas, J. E. Smith, The Big Picture trends, drivers, wild cards, discontinuities and weak signals, Futures 43
Change 77 (2010) 355 368.13 S. Popper, J. Griffin, C. Berrebi, T. Light, E. Y. Min, Natural gas and Israel's energy future:
I. Miles, M. Mogee, A. Salo, F. Scapolo, R. Smits, W. Thissen, Technology futures analysis: toward integration of the field and new methods, Technol.
Technology policy and Management, Delft University of Technology, Delft, 2008, p. 285.37 E. Pruyt, J. Kwakkel, A bright future for system dynamics:
the future of copper, Technol. Forecast. Soc. Change (in press), http://dx. doi. org/10.1016/j. techfore. 2012.09.012.43 B. P. Bryant, R. J. Lempert, Thinking inside the box:
Change 76 (2009) 1150 1162.46 P. Martens, J. Rotmans, Transitions in a globalising world, Futures 37 (2005) 1133 1144.47 D. Loorbach, N
to explore future developments, including technology forecasting, technology intelligence, future studies, foresight, and technology assessment 1. In their own ways each of these approaches is used for analyzing technological developments and their potential consequences.
Technology refers both to physical artifacts as well as to social practices that specify how these artifacts can be used.
3. If the mechanisms of the clock are known, any future state of the clock can be predicted.
one could predict the future development of this phenomenon. With the rise of computers and user friendly software, more and more mechanisms can be,
In their agenda setting paper on FTA Porter et al. 1 note that there are many irreducible uncertainties inherent in the forces driving toward an unknown future beyond the short termand predictions need not be assumed to constitute necessary precursors to effective action.
and what is the range of plausible future dynamic developments of a phenomenon of interest?
for decisions can be designed to be robust across the explored range of possible futures. By supporting the systematic exploration of the complete space of combinations of uncertainties,
Future uncertainty is increasing because contextual conditions are less stable, new technical solutions are emerging,
political uncertainty about future CO2 abatement policies such as emission trading; and socioeconomic uncertainty about fuel prices, investment decisions of suppliers,
This EMA use of the model is reported below. 3. 1. 2. Uncertainties The future evolution of the extraction
which one can sample. 3. 2. 3. Analysis of results One key challenge for airport planners is to design a plan for guiding the future developments of the airport that is robust with respect to the future 36.
and in particular the ratio of capacity to demand, it is clear that the outlined plan does succeed not in robustly guiding the future development of the airport.
It is thus better able to guide the future developments of the airport in light of the uncertainties.
or by modifying the stricter slot allocation regime. 3. 3. Identification of plausible transition pathways for the future Dutch electricity generation system Recent contextual developments constitute a backdrop of change
political uncertainty about future CO2 abetment policies such as emission trading; and socioeconomic uncertainty about fuel prices, investment decisions of suppliers,
but the expected future investment cost towards which the option evolves during the time horizon of the simulation. 3. 3. 3. Analysis of results Fig. 5 shows a performance envelope for five outcome indicators.
the future generation of energy will not be very sustainable. That is, in most cases, the fraction of fossil based generation in the final year is higher than 0. 6. Thus,
Name Description Range Investment cost factor Multiplier factor to alter the future investment cost of new generation options 0. 6 1. 25 Operational cost factor
Multiplier factor to alter the future variable operating costs of a technology 0. 6 1. 25 Coal
E. Pruyt/Technological forecasting & Social Change 80 (2013) 419 431 irreducible uncertainties inherent in the forces driving toward an unknown future beyond the short term
and guiding the future development of an airport. The case illustrated how through the use of nonlinear optimization techniques a performance bandwidth could be established across all the uncertainties.
FTA aims at offering systemic considerations on future developments for dynamically complex issues. The comprehensive exploration of the consequences of combinations of uncertainties that can be offered by EMA is an important component of such future-oriented
systemic thinking. All three cases illustrate this systemic exploration, while in particular the first and third case demonstrate how this can be combined with nonlinear dynamic models (System Dynamics and Agent Based Modeling respectively),
and decision-making by helping in anticipating and shaping future developments. The second case demonstrates how EMA can be used for guiding decision-making on plans that shape the long-term development of an airport.
Moreover, EMA can also be used for creatively imagining possible futures and subsequently selecting interesting ones, by combining it with scenario discovery 48.
Alternatively, EMA offers the potential to support the process of creatively imagining possible futures, a purpose for which it was used in the first case study. The techniques used in each of the tree cases do not exclude each other.
Future research avenues include elaborating on the use of EMA for designing dynamic adaptive policies and the use of EMA for 429 J. H. Kwakkel, E. Pruyt/Technological forecasting & Social Change 80
I. Miles, M. Mogee, A. Salo, F. Scapolo, R. E. H. M. Smits, W. Thissen, Technology futures analysis:
and the Future of Nature, Island Press, WASHINGTON DC, 2000.3 G. Smith, Newton's philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica, in:
Why Environmental Scientists Can't Predict the Future, Columbia University Press, New york, USA, 2007.7 R. J. Lempert, S. Popper, S. Bankes, Shaping The next One hundred Years:
Recycl. 54 (2010) 1074 1083.21 W. Auping, The uncertain future of copper, in: An Exploratory System Dynamics Model and Analysis of the Global Copper System in The next 40 Years, Delft University of Technology, Delft, 2011.22 J. H. Kwakkel, W
. Auping, E. Pruyt, The uncertain future of copper: dynamic scenario discovery under deep uncertainty, Technological forecasting and Social Change,(under review.
Future scenarios to inspire innovation Peter De Smedt a,, Kristian Borch b, Ted Fuller c a SVR, Research centre of the Flemish Government, Boudewijnlaan 30, B-1000 Brussels, Belgium b Department of Management Engineering
it is not sensible to extrapolate the future from data and relationships of the past.
which futures thinking can be used as a tool for inspiring actions and structures that address the grand challenges.
elements of good practices and principles on how to strengthen innovation systems through future scenarios are identified. This is needed because innovation itself needs to be oriented along more sustainable pathways enabling transformations of socio-technical systems. 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Reflexive inquiry Innovation Scenario practice Grand challenges 1. Introduction In the context of this paper, future scenarios can be seen as narratives set in the future to explore how the society would change
Future scenarios substantially differ from predictions, i e.,, extrapolations or trends, substituting the criterion of plausibility for probability 1. Scenarios are not equivalent to images of the future,
but they consist of images of the future. Images of the future are snapshots of future states,
whereas scenarios consist of a logical sequence of images of the future 2. 1. 1. Developing
and using future scenarios Scenario analysis is practiced across many domains and is restricted not to specialized futurists or scenario specialists 3. Developing and using scenarios can contribute at various levels of society by generating appropriate inputs for planning
and decision-making and by facilitating dialogues between various stakeholders 4. The value of the scenario exercise depends on the ways in
which the resulting insights are implemented in on-going and forthcoming actions. However, the explicit and direct uses of scenarios in predefined decision-making contexts are just part of a broader social process 5. Also important indirect and diffuse links exist between developing
& Social Change Developing and using future scenarios can: -contribute to society's strategic intelligence by stimulating future-oriented thinking
and by widening the perspectives and knowledge base of researchers, policy-makers and business decision-makers. -be useful in creating a common language and understanding between the various interest groups.
scenarios that imaginatively represent plausible futures will meet resistance if they are used as predictions. 1. 2. Grand challenges The aim of this paper is to initiate a discussion on how scenario analysis can help to better cope with the grand challenges
One result of the above described complexity is a type of uncertainty about the future, an uncertainty
and engineer the future produce increased uncertainties 13. For instance, developments in science and technology have a strong potential to influence social change.
Futures thinking is an essential element of developing such a strategy. For example, Hamel and Prahalad 17 emphasize that strategy should draw up consistent visions of the future.
In addition several scholars state that scenarios constitute a major tool for considering the future in strategic planning 18 23.
The traditional concepts and models of innovation are not always adequate to embrace the complexity for addressing the grand challenges 10,15.
we analyze several scenario exercises to better understand the role future scenarios can play as a tool for orienting innovation systems.
Section 3 describes how we conceptualize inspiring issues and paradigms from different scientific disciplines such as business and innovation research, futures studies, sociology and policy analysis.
or perceived modes of thinking about the future and multiple stakeholder values are initiating enablers or barriers for the scenario process.
/Technological forecasting & Social Change 80 (2013) 432 443 2. Material and methods How can we learn about orienting innovation systems from future scenario practice?
and using future scenarios present a window of opportunity to effectively drive decisions?(ii) How can developing
and using future scenarios enhance the legitimacy for action?(iii) How can developing and using future scenarios provide evidence to decision-makers empowering the stakeholders involved?
The three questions represent a specific perspective linking action and decision-makingwith issues of (i) emergence,
futures thinking and scenarios 3. 1. Innovation systems Innovation involves the application of new ideas or the reapplication of old ideas in new ways to develop better solutions to our needs 31.
Thus through trial-and-error and learning-by-doing 1 The Cost Action A22 network was a four year program (2004 2007) entitled Foresight methodologies Exploring new ways to explore the future and funded by the Individuals, Societies, Culture
Futures thinking Futures thinking is used for medium to long-term strategic analysis and planning. According to Jørgensen 41, citing Dreborg 42,
there are three modes of thinking about the future, each with their own methodologies the predictive, the eventualities and the visionary mode of thinking, see Table 1 for a more elaborate description.
the different modes of thinking imply a focus on a different representation of the future. Representations of the future can be seen as metaphorical descriptions.
Usually, these representations are mental images, but they can also be external representations, such as pictures or textual imagery 43.
but it has been shown that differences in the construction of time play a significant role in the construction of meaning about the future (e g. of nanotechnologies 44).
Gaston Berger started using scenarios to explore the long-term political and social future. He founded the Centre d'Etudes Prospectives
i e. scenarios intended to provide a guiding vision of the future for policy-makers 46. Scenario building and planning was developed further for management purposes, for example through the works of Pierre Wack
The categories arise from the kinds of question that a scenario user might use about the future:
scenarios are concerned normative scenarios with achieving particular future objectives which lead to preserving and transforming scenarios.
what would need to be changed for the target futures to be achieved. Although most reviews of scenario techniques distinguish between quantitative and qualitative techniques,
Table 1 Modes of thinking about the future. Source: adapted from Jørgensen 41. Modes of thinking Type of futures in focus Characteristics The predictive mode Probable futures Working with indications of what will happen.
Trying to find the most likely development The eventualities mode Possible futures Openness to several different developments The visionary mode Preferable futures Envisioning how society can be designed in a better way 435 P
. De Smedt et al.//Technological forecasting & Social Change 80 (2013) 432 443 The concept of the multiple-axes method is based on one of the approaches used by Pierre Wack 52.
by placing a major factor influencing the future of the issue being investigated on each of the axes,
Backcasting, inspired by the early work of Lovins 53, starts with defining a desirable future and then works backwards to identify policies
and programs that will connect the future to the present. Backcasting scenarios explore the preconditions that could lead to this desirable future,
including a palette of strategies to reach this situation 54. The concept of roadmapping has its roots in science
which provides a means to link technology and other resources to future products, as well as to innovation objectives and milestones 55.
All the above describe approaches to futures thinking during which (potential) inputs for scenarios can be produced.
For example Delphi studies use statements about the future, roadmaps and backcasting use end-point states, while most of the other techniques described produce narratives or images of alternative future states.
Practices are very diverse and often combinations of techniques 61. These types of approaches are typical of those used in our analysis (see Appendix 1 for an overview of the scenario cases.
and using future scenarios in the case studies from Appendix 1 . When the motivation is oriented towards developing scenarios,
where the motivation is oriented towards using the future scenarios for strategic discussions. The focus here is less on
whether the scenarios delineate the range of possible futures appropriately 64. As documented by van der Heijden 65,
The Prelude scenarios2 are a good example (see Appendix 1). An important input for the scenario work in this group are the comprehensive descriptions of the external drivers for change highlighting the uncertainty of future developments.
This uncertainty is reflected in a distinguished set of possible long-term future images that are derived often from a multi-axes framework of the most important but uncertain drivers of change.
This method is excellent for presenting a rich picture of multiple facets of a potential future:
so they legitimate the future since imaginations are owned by the individuals relating them 67. Creating awareness for the unforeseen is most often an important objective and desired outcome of this group of scenario practice.
Still, it is less obvious how these scenarios can be used for bridging today's decisions with the future images.
We found that crystallizing concrete policy initiatives for innovation from long-term future images, i e. beyond twenty years, can be difficult.
When considered from the perspective of creating legitimacy for action we also suggest that the scenarios in this group could benefit fromcomplementary techniques connecting the long-term future images to the present via stepping stones.
Moreover, while participatory scenario-making provides visions for multiple futures, a roadmap only operates with one vision.
Developing a set of scenarios acknowledges multiple rather than one future, equally plausible, whereas roadmapping provides a framework for condensing all information in one map
and timeframe revealing windows of opportunity thus linking decision-making with future scenarios. The legitimizing aspect of this is the creation of a common understanding of challenges
But in contrast with the first group, change is described less by framing very different long-term future worlds.
We found that selecting areas for future opportunities are the general theme in the lessons learnt from this group.
/Technological forecasting & Social Change 80 (2013) 432 443 The images of the future are focused on key internal developments
and enriching the future images. Flexibility, either avoidance of surprises or fast utilization of sudden opportunities
The principles can be seen as indirect and implicit representations of the future. The future plays the role of the time needed to introduce the necessary changes to comply with the envisaged principles.
The concept of change is an implicit part of the scenarios developed in backcasting from principles
but the focus is less on delineating the range of possible futures and more on a preferable future vision.
This is often reflected in the outcomes envisioning a preferable future and experiments towards that future.
Comprehensive and well-designed roadmaps linking today's experiments with future images can improve the impact of the scenarios.
In addition the success of the roadmaps can be tested for different possible future images. This will provide essential information about the robustness of the innovation potential.
and using future scenarios to inspire innovation do not only deal with the collection of data and models;
Our analysis suggests that scenarios developed with broader stakeholder/expert participation will provide richer future images that go beyond the probable that is determined by the past and present 73,75.
Stakeholder involvement, for instance, may be facilitated by conceptualizing the future as open and dilemmatic, and recognizing ambivalence as legitimate 76.
investigating and utilizing potential future societal changes and developments, see also 62,77. To synthesize this section on results and implications,
In the next section we will discuss our findings against the initial key question of how futures thinking
and how future scenarios can inspire innovation. 3 http://www. naturalstep. org/./438 P. De Smedt et al./
it is not sensible to extrapolate the future fromdata and relationships of the past. Hence, it is important to recognize that representing scientific and technological diversity offers an important means to help foster more effective forms of innovation
It is accepted widely that a vision about the future is an essential element of a strategy 16,17.
In addition, several scholars state that scenarios constitute a major tool for considering the future in strategic planning 18
The question that emerges is how we can learn from using and developing future scenarios to assist in the orientation of innovation systems?
However, the commonality of scenario applications is the orientation to the future and that the knowledge produced is uncertain.
and using future scenarios present a window of opportunity to effectively drive decisions?;(ii) How can developing
and using future scenarios enhance the legitimacy for action?;and (iii) How can developing and using future scenarios provide evidence to decision-makers empowering the stakeholders involved?.
By questioning representation from a policy perspective and deconstructing future scenario practice, we were able to (re) construct findings to the above questions:(
i) if a sense of urgency was established or was lacking (window of opportunity),(ii) what was and was represented not (legitimacy for action)
An overview of our findings is presented in Table 2 that describes for each group of practice (sub-sections 4. 1 4. 3) the most common images of the future, an example of a characteristic technique and the dominant mode of futures thinking.
Instead of framing practice based on theory, future scenario practice is deconstructed into seven groups. These seven groups are linked further to the most characteristic theoretical premises
here expressed as modes of futures thinking. For example, we argue that a strong focus on developing scenarios
In the first group, we found that the scenarios are used for supporting strategic discussions about futures that are shaped by surprise and confrontation.
Principles on how to orient innovation systems through future scenarios will require conditions for collaboration. Table 2 Linking groups of future scenario practice from a policy perspective with modes of future thinking.
Policy perspective (representation) Scenario practice (most characteristic) Types of futures (main focus) Techniques (example) Modes of futures thinking Window of opportunity (sense of urgency) Using scenarios Shaped by surprise
and confrontation Uncertainty matrix Intuitive Developing scenarios Shaped by convention Consensus (Delphi) Convention Legitimacy for action
Clearly, scenarios do not point to simple short-cuts into a more sustainable future 64. Table 3 provides a brief description for each of the 7 dominant modes of futures thinking.
For each of the modes of future thinking, we also include information on the proposed effects on
or contributions to the enablers for orientating innovation systems through future scenarios (i e. pros and cons). Our analysis of the case studies listed in Appendix 1 suggests that a variety of modes of futures thinking,
as articulations of theoretical premises, can be distinguished in future scenario practice. In addition, we abstracted different dominant modes of futures thinking linked within different groups.
In reality, each scenario exercise is a mixture of different modes and practice is shaped by the image (s) of the future and the techniques applied.
Combinations of techniques are possible and can be found in our case studies and in literature, see for instance 71,81.
To strengthen the enablers for innovation within the scenario process, the link between practice and theory,
represented via the modes of futures thinking should be acknowledged when designing and implementing future scenario exercises.
As described in Section 4 (results and implications) cross-fertilizations between the techniques of the different groups can enhance the innovation potential.
when looking at combination possibilities of the modes of futures thinking in Table 3. To synthesize,
we argue that future scenarios developed with a combination of well-designed modes of futures thinking will provide richer future images that go beyond the probable that is determined by the past and present.
and discussed the applicability of future scenarios as narratives to represent different perspectives on present and future developments.
and using future scenarios as a tool for orienting innovation systems. Our analyses of the scenario case studies from Appendix 1 revealed elements of good practice and implications on how to better address innovation through future scenarios.
For instance different modes of futures thinking have been identified through the process of deconstruction. In this paper, we argue that these modes of futures thinking are shown to contribute in different ways to orientating innovation systems.
Hence, by using a reflexive methodology we were able to create a heuristic to learn from the process of developing
and using scenarios. In addition, we also identified some points of departure for further refinement of current scenario practices with respect to innovation.
Firstly, and summarizing our recommendations for future scenario practice, we suggest that representation issues (i e. what is,
or was lacking) are an important feature in the design and application of future scenario practice.
We also want to Table 3 Different modes of futures thinking for orienting innovation systems via future scenarios.
Modes of futures thinking Future scenarios shaped by Underpinning Logic pros and cons with respect to orient innovation systems Intuitive Surprise and confrontation Think the unthinkable
and conceptualize future situations where uncertainties are high Allows strong imagination including alternative futures that are competing Weak on acceptance,
but often too vague, too broad to inspire innovation Eventuality Possibility Explore contrasting futures and conceptualize future situations for the long-term where uncertainties are expressed differently Allows rigorously exploring boundaries and complexity.
Often an imbalance between outward/inward reflection limiting the recognition of its internal innovation capacity Predictive Probability Better contextualize
i e. using a policy perspective for doing an ex-post analysis of future scenario practice. Innovation systems are complex and dynamic
and not only probable or desired futures among the actors that develop, diffuse, and use innovations. Learning of participants is not always an objective as such,
investigating and utilizing potential future societal changes and developments. This integrated approach, i e. integrating different modes of futures thinking, is needed for orienting innovation along more sustainable pathways enabling transformations of socio-technical systems.
However, a variety of representation issues exist and more experiments and research are needed. Thirdly, we want to emphasize that the social dimension in innovation systems should be acknowledged as a legitimate research area
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