dealing with certain securities. Article 9 (3) of the ECD obliges the Member States to
creditworthiness, security mechanisms, price transparency, provision of information, customer service, data protection and dispute settlement. Well-known trustmarks within the EU include
security of these systems. A large majority of stakeholders confirmed the need for regulatory measures regarding the mutual recognition and acceptance of e-identification and
a lack of payment security and data protection, and finally uncertainties relating to liability in case of unauthorised payments or unsatisfactory deliveries
This raises the question of the security of payments: a lack of trust is symptomatic,
failures in the security of payments. All relevant market actors seem willing to address this
problem while realising that there is a trade-off between the level of security and convenience
It is important that the perceived lack of security does not continue to hamper e-commerce, especially at a cross-border level.
•More payment security and customer trust Each of these objectives would benefit from a more integrated European market for card
with payment security and data privacy and the possibilities for improvements in this area The last part of the Green Paper touches on a crucial issue,
Governance Forum (IGF) on issues such as the sustainability and security of the Internet Despite the usefulness of several multilateral dialogues on e-commerce, the Commission
security for operators and goods; by increase safety and security, intra-logistics processes will thus be
improved The Wellbeing Services Use Case The City of the Future Living Lab is involved in
ago by Security Solutions Institute. This prototype became the basis for further development of the
security is becoming a large concern for the consumer. While users are great lovers of integrated devices, the security issues enhance
the need of combining devices to ensure fighting cybercrime. One way to avoid the need of two elec
-tronic devices to ensure security is checking from the payment device itself that is actually using it
into a smart phone needs a high level of security to protect from cybercrime. This means that the right
8.)†Equity and Security across the world'(8 9.)†Technology, innovation and entrepreneur
8) The area †equity and security across the world†refers to equity and security as being basic prerequisites to foster and
support sustainable development (see, for example: UNDP 2011; Barth 2011a 9) The area of †technology, innovation and entrepreneurship
securities and insurance markets. Such mechanism enforces compliance with all laws and regulations governing the financial market,
-cerns about functionality, security, storage, and privacy are addressed. This requires a focus on transparency from the citizen†s perspective.
-age, but it also raises the security risk of large with -drawals, notwithstanding privacy concerns.
-cation, Health, Security, Citizenship, Agribusiness Regional Development, Public Management, Logistic Infrastructure, Innovation and Technology, Environ
-nology Security and Safety, the association Crimi -Nee, Philips Lighting, Vinotion and the TU/e Intel
Lighting, for instance, is regulated highly on security issues, and a company such as Curana has no idea how to cope with these challenges.
Lighting, for instance, is regulated highly on security issues, and a company such as Curana has no idea how to cope with these challenges.
energy/water as well as institutions for security, health education and the legal system ï Economic stability and growth are conducive to future revenues
Institutions for security, health education, legal system (e g. employment and bankruptcy law Economic stability Right timing Resources
Institutions for security, health education, legal system (e g. employment and bankruptcy law Economic stability Right timing The arrow â€oeright timing†only indicates that the right time matters;
Since the European culture is said to favour security, the risk of failure may be an important impediment to
Institutions for security health education, legal system Largely national regulation †no specific role for EU except opinion leadership
energy/water as well as institutions for security, health education and the legal system ï Economic stability and growth are conducive to future revenues
Institutions for security, health education, legal system (e g. employment and bankruptcy law Economic stability Right timing Resources
Institutions for security, health education, legal system (e g. employment and bankruptcy law Economic stability Right timing The arrow â€oeright timing†only indicates that the right time matters;
Since the European culture is said to favour security, the risk of failure may be an important impediment to
Institutions for security health education, legal system Largely national regulation †no specific role for EU except opinion leadership
Socially diverse local communities located in well-planned development can foster a sense of place, pride, security
security, speedy access to Broadband, R&d and e-Skills †which underpin the single digital
Security of energy supply at a competitive price is a cornerstone of future sustainable development
Ensure security of energy supply in order to support economic and social development Source energy at a price that does not adversely affect competitiveness
provides security of generation capacity within the Southeast. The building of appropriately located gas fired
the security of supply and provide opportunities to export and/or import electricity. The electrical distribution net
Promote best practice in line with the EU 2020 Digital Agenda with regard to interoperability, security speedy access to Broadband, R&d and e-Skills †which underpin the single digital market
security and justice, can be sustained in an era of ageing populations, global warming and much greater diversity
Production and automation technology, Cleantech, and Security. These fields present the regional strength in regional publicly funded R&d and industrial activity.
multilingual services, online safety and security, intelligent energy networks and smart energy services). ) To best harness EU funding from these various financial instruments, one of the key
security, etc b) have a sectoral focus targeting ICT industrial and technological leadership in R&d&i fields
security, software, gaming, social networking, digital media, digital content, e-learning; Creative and cultural enterprise Innovative Processes for
B Data Analytics, Management, Security & Privacy I Sustainable Food Production & Processing C Digital Platforms, Content & Applications J Marine Renewable Energy
security, software, gaming, social networking, digital media, digital content, e-learning; Creative and cultural enterprise Innovative Processes for
B Data Analytics, Management, Security & Privacy I Sustainable Food Production & Processing C Digital Platforms, Content & Applications J Marine Renewable Energy
programming, mecatronics, security, e-health, ITC for transport, new media, irrespectively networks of the future, internet services, software and visualization, media network and 3d
GPS, ERP data systems, cloud computing, intelligent wireless networks, cybernetic security safe software systems, mobile applications design, etc
Security Socioeconomic Space Textiles Agro-Food ICT Intelligent sys Health Energy Pharmaceuticals Environment Security Space
Materials Biotechnologies Transport Socioeconomic 13 Panels 90 Micro-visions 29 domains +Exploratory Online consultation Argumentative
•Analysis, management and security of big data •Future internet •Software development technologies, instruments, and methods
Security, and Heritage and cultural identity Process: http://www. poscce. research. ro/ro/node/node/nid/2438
•Security & Space •National heritage & identity, cohesion and cross-cultural linkages Smart specialization fields
•ICT, Security & Space •Energy, Environment & Climate changes •Eco-nano-technologies & Advanced Materials
ICT, Security & Space Focus on changes related to Smart Specialization so far Micro-vision fiches after refining (see the Annex for the full process:
Security; Intelligent Systems; Socioeconomics Space medicine Science; Transport ICT Rationale: ICT prioritized for information security & space security because of new info regarding the
sectoral strategies (not available at the time of the first version; RO is external border of UE
Security Health Environment Materials ICT Energy Biotechnology Agrofood •Governance of RDI strategy •National level
-sciences and nanotechnologies, automotive, security and new production technologies "•Measuring the progress •23
Security Intelligent Systems; Socioeconomics; Space medicine Science; Transport -Prioritization and version Dec. 2013 Public debate -National R&d institutes
ensuring necessary preconditions for information, education and security Starting from the fundamental pillars of the strategy we developed a set of
security (pre -conditions -the degree of digital alphabetization of the population -%of employees with experience in using
Web services in EU) to enjoy high levels of security and confidence, a balanced regulatory framework with well defined rights, the strengthening of multi-territory
 security  and  quality  of  supply  (ii  enabling  the
 security  and  discussions  on  data  privacy  On  the
Social Dynamics, Innovative Society and Security ï¿IT Services The next steps ï¿We are moving forward in the process with the help of a
activities like aeronautics, information and communication technologies, security, biotechnology and logistics The industrial policy of the Regional Government has established four main priorities in the support of emerging
security Citizens •Positive indicators: number of homes with computers and devices and Internet access, high use of ecommerce, high
 security  Building the evidence base for RIS3 (II SWOT Analysis Knowledge Digital Society
Zephyr and Securities Data Corporation databases as well as com -pany web sites and specialized websites) we discovered that collect
Business & Industry, Factiva, Zephyr and the Securities Data Corpora -tion (SDC) databases as well as from company web sites.
Industry, Factiva, Zephyr and the Securities Data Corporation (SDC databases as well as company websites and specialized websites) to
security, bankruptcy legislation, competition policy, product market regulation, labour market regulation, finance markets and intellectual property protection.
and they have a certain security and knowledge of what the future will Hold in turn in the neoliberal or Anglo-saxon model
mechanisms for ensuring trust and security (Kippert & Swiercz, 2007; Garrison & Posey, 2006), easy-to-use
Computer security Checklist for Non-Security Technology Professionals, Journal of International Technology and Information management, 15 (3), 87-91
In ICT, how will we manage the security and privacy of personal data with global digital content doubling every eighteen
security. This will also lead to many â€oezero†initiatives like zero emails, zero time business incubation, zero-design-to-shelf (retail) to name a few
transportation, buildings, security, governance, education and healthcare Source: Frost & Sullivan Social Innovation to answer Society†s Challenges
the dominant issues of safety and security However, the global energy future will not be entirely dominated by fuel
security (65.2%)and access to catalogues and price lists (52.8 %Services available on the website Percentage over the total number of companies with 10 or more employees and an Internet connection
Privacy policy statement or certification related to website security 65.2 Access to product catalogues or price lists 52.8
cloud computing, enhanced privacy and security features and advanced multimedia capabilities. This core platform will be based on integration of already existing re
⠀ Security and Trust ⠀ Experiments and Experimental Design •Future Internet Areas
Security and Trust Introduction to Part III...163 Security Design for an Inter-Domain Publish/Subscribe Architecture...
167 Kari Visala, Dmitrij Lagutin, and Sasu Tarkoma Engineering Secure Future Internet Services...177 Wouter Joosen, Javier Lopez, Fabio Martinelli, and Fabio Massacci
Towards Formal Validation of Trust and Security in the Internet of Services...193 Roberto Carbone, Marius Minea, Sebastian Alexander Moâ dersheim
mobility, ubiquitous access, usage, security including trust and privacy The content of this area includes eight chapters covering some of the above architec
security, prove -nance, consistency, versioning and availability; it glues together reusable information fragments into meaningful structured and integrated documents without the need of a
Lack of data integrity, reliability and trust, targeting the security and protection of data; this issue covers both unintended disclosure and damage to integrity from
Security requirements of the transmission links: Communications privacy does not only mean protecting/encrypting the exchanged data
v. Security of the whole Internet Architecture. The Internet architecture is not intrin -sically secure and is based on add-ons to, e g. protocols,
•Accountability of resource usage and security without impeding user privacy utility and self-arbitration:
•Security: see Subsection. 3. 5 point 5, Subsection 3. 1. Point. 2 and 3
Trust and Security. The authors would like to acknowledge and thank all members of the group for their significant input and the EC Scientific Officers Isidro Laso Balles
promotes diversity, and promises security and increased manageability We define In-Network clouds as an integral part of the differentiated Future Inter
framework services share common security, metadata, administration, and manage -ment services. The DOC enables the following functions across the orchestration
Since each domain may have different SLAS, security and Towards In-Network Clouds in Future Internet 23
safety, security/identity checking, video surveillance, etc. Predictions state that there will be 225 million cellular M2m devices by 2014 with little traffic per node but re
knowledge relating to security functionality and the use of policy rules to control end -to end configuration of this functionality can provide a basis for the support flexible
and associated security mechanisms that are required to enable dynamic loosely -coupled systems. The number of participants can be m:
A comprehensive security framework provides func -tions for the realization of a variety of different trust relationships.
-censing, security, provenance, consistency, versioning and availability; it glues together reusable information fragments into meaningful structured and inte
privacy, licensing, security, provenance, consistency, versioning and availability 5. IDN glues together reusable information fragments into meaningful structured and
growth of small and/or mobile devices and sensors, of services and of security re -quirements began to show that current Internet is becoming itself a bottleneck.
approach to properly meet new requirements in security, privacy and economic sus -tainability. GENI 6 (Global Environment for Network Innovations) is a virtual labo
A so-called Supervisor and Security Module (not shown for clarity reason in Fig. 2 is embedded in each Cognitive Manager supervising the whole Cognitive Manager
and, at the same time, assuring the overall security of the Cognitive Manager itself e g.,, including end-to-end encryption, Authentication, Authorization and Accounting
AAA) at user and device level, Service Security, Intrusion Detection, etc..Another key role of this module is to dynamically decide, consistently with the application
-bility, Qos and security The changing needs of the entities may vary depending on the context of the
OVM (Ontology for Vulnerability Management) to support security needs 35; Netqosont (Network Qos Ontology) to meet the needs of service quality
-tion of the entities and the formalization of security mechanisms for the Entity Title Model.
IEEE/IFIP New Technologies, Mobility and Security Conference (2009 24 Pereira, J. H. S.,Kofuji, S. T.,Rosa, P. F.:
IEEE/IFIP New Technologies, Mobility and Security Conference (2009 25 Pereira, J.,Sato, L.,Rosa, P.,Kofuji, S.:
Security. Information security Journal: A Global Perspective (2010 36 Wong, W.:et al.:An Architecture for Mobility Support in a Next Generation
The investigation of (European) regulation for e-services markets and security regula -tions;( (7) The investigation of the physical environment of e-services in terms of
consideration, since detailed and specific security demands, electronic identities, or Quality-of-Experience (Qoe) will outline societal requirements to be met by techno
and has some security benefit. As a counter -example, IPV6 deployment has a cost to the end host to support the dual stack, but the
the wider scenario requires extra critical functionality †for example, security features if the initial scenario is trusted within a domain.
and quantifying security risks in organi -zations. The situations analyzed by the aforementioned methodologies are often asso
-sessed by philosophers and politicians as well as security and trust experts 4 Survey of Work on Social and Economic Tussles as
deal with this security problem and the fears that it raises among end-users. There is a
Security and Trust Part III: Future Internet Foundations: Security and Trust 163 Introduction If you are asking for the major guiding principles of Future Internet technology and
applications, the answer is likely to include â€oesharing and collaborationâ€. Cloud com -puting, for instance, is built on shared resources and computing environments, offer
-gies, applications and users to the next level of evolution, it also raises security and privacy concerns and introduces additional protection needs.
design security and trust solutions that scale to Future Internet complexity and keep the information and resource owner in control, balancing potentially conflicting re
about security properties of exposed services and information 164 Part III: Future Internet Foundations: Security and Trust
The chapters presented in the Security and Trust section of this volume look at the challenges mentioned above from three different angles.
First, Future Internet princi -ples are supported by revised communication paradigms, which address potential security issues from the beginning,
but also imply the need for novel solutions like integrity and availability. The chapter, â€oesecurity Design for an Inter-domain Pub
-lish/Subscribe Architecture†by K. Visala et al. looks into security implications of a data-centric approach for the Future Internet, replacing point-to-point communication
introduce a security architecture based on self-certifying name schemes and scoping that ensure the availability of data
of how clean-slate approaches to the Future Internet can support security needs by design, rather than provided as an add-on to an existing approach,
evidence and a systematic approach to ensure that best security practices are applied in the design and operation of Future Internet components are essential to provide the
-size multilateral security requirements, the composability of secure services, the pro -vision of assurance through formal evidence and the consideration of risk and cost
of Future Internet specific security engineering research strands. One of the major ingredients of this program, the provision of security assurance through formal valida
-tion of security properties of services, is investigated in detail in the chapter †Towards Formal Validation of Trust and Security in the Internet of Services†by R. Carbone et
al. They introduce a language to specify the security aspects of services and a valida
-tion platform based on model-checking. A number of distinguished features ensure the feasibility of the approach to Future Internet scenarios and the scalability to its
complexity: it supports service orchestration and hierarchical reasoning, the language is sufficiently expressive so that translators from commonly used business process
-strate the way towards rigorous security and trust assurance in the future Internet addressing one of the major obstacles preventing businesses and users to fully exploit
Security and Trust 165 chapters looks into specific instances of the information sharing and collaboration
principle and introduces novel means to establish their security. The chapter â€oetrust -worthy Clouds underpinning the Future Internet†of R. Glott et al. discusses latest
trends in cloud computing and related security issues. The vision of clouds-of-clouds describes collaboration and federation of independent cloud providers to provide
faces new security risks, from the breach of separation between tenants to the compli -ance challenge in case of distribution over different regulatory domains.
-atic security risk management process. In cloud computing, but also in most other Future Internet scenarios like the Internet of Services, the need for data exchange
how security and trust risks emerging from the increased level of sharing and collabo -ration in the future Internet can be mitigated,
Security Design for an Inter-Domain Publish/Subscribe Architecture Kari Visala1, Dmitrij Lagutin1, and Sasu Tarkoma2
In this paper we present a security design through the network stack for a data-centric pub/sub architecture that achieves
and allows application-specific security poli -cies while remaining scalable. We analyse the solution and examine the mini
security properties advertised Keywords: Future Internet, publish/subscribe networking, network security 1 Introduction Data-centric pub/sub as a communication abstraction 2, 3,
and the security design presented here covers all these as a whole. In this paper we refine and extend our work in 5
Our security goals concur with 1 except that confidentiality and privacy are ex -pected to be handled on top of the network layer
The security goals are •Availability, which means that the attackers cannot prevent communication be
Security Design for an Inter-Domain Publish/Subscribe Architecture 169 scope must be trusted by the communicating nodes to function as promised and much
of the security of our architecture is based on this assumption as we explain in 5
Here the security model only guarantees the integrity of the association between an identifier and its content.
but they are assumed not to have a long life-time as the security mechanism is cou
Security Design for an Inter-Domain Publish/Subscribe Architecture 171 Fig. 1. Publications can refer to other publications persistently using long-term Aids.
-Security Design for an Inter-Domain Publish/Subscribe Architecture 173 tion data or pending subscription alive.
description of the rendezvous security mechanisms Scopes, however, can have varying implementations. When a cached result cannot
security solutions. A data-oriented network architecture DONA 4 replaces a tradi -tional DNS-based namespace with self-certifying flat labels,
Security issues of the content-based pub/sub system have been explored in 7. The work proposes secure event types,
Security Design for an Inter-Domain Publish/Subscribe Architecture 175 5. 1 Security Mechanisms Most of existing network layer security proposals utilize hash chains or Merkle trees
8. Examples of hash chain based solutions include TESLA 9, which is based time hash chain scheme,
and ALPHA 10 that relies on interaction between the sender and receiver. While hash chain approaches are very lightweight,
Accountable Internet Protocol (AIP) 11 aims to improve security by providing accountability on the network layer.
Security issues and requirements for Internet-scale publish-subscribe systems. In: HICSS †02, Hawaii, USA (2002
Roles and Security in a Publish/Subscribe Network architecture. In: ISCC€ 10, Riccione, Italy (2010 6. Clark, D.,Wroclawski, J.,Sollins, K.,Braden, R.:
engineering and security engineering. Generic solutions that ignore the characteristics of Future Internet services will fail,
order to jointly enable the security and trustworthiness of Future Internet services 1 Introduction 1. 1 Future Internet Services
and security breaches in these services may lead to large ï nancial loss and damaged reputation
research directions in order to link security concerns with business needs and thus supporting a business case for security matters
Our research addresses the early phases of the development process of ser -vices, bearing in mind that the discovery and remediation of vulnerabilities dur
1) security requirements for FI services,(2) creating secure service architectures and secure service design,(3) supporting programming en
and compose-able services,(4) enabling security assurance integrating the former results in (5) a risk-aware and cost-aware software devel
Both the security assurance programme and the programme on Risk and Cost aware SDLC will interact with each of the initial
2 Security Requirements Engineering The main focus of this research strand is to enable the modeling of high-level
evidence that the identiï ed security requirements have been met from the point of view of all stakeholders.
The security requirements of Future Internet applica -tions will diï €er considerably from those of traditional applications.
in a service composition and each one will have his own security requirements Hence, eliciting, reconciling,
and modeling all the stakeholders†security require -ments become a major challenge 5. Multilateral Security Requirements Anal
-ysis techniques have been advocated in the state of the art 14 but substantial research is needed still. In this respect, agent-oriented and goal-oriented ap
Furthermore, it is important that security requirements are addressed from a higher level perspective, e g.,, in terms of the actors†relationships with each
-sider security only at the technological level. In other words, current approaches provide modeling and reasoning support for encryption,
-ployments inherit security risks from the classical Internet and, at the same time create new and more complex security challenges.
Examples include illicit track -ing of RFID tags (privacy violation) and cloning of data on RFID tags (identity
-ing attackers), the elicitation of high-level security goals for all stakeholders and the identiï cation and resolution of conï icts among diï €erent stakeholder
security goals †The reï nement of security goals into more detailed security requirements for
speciï c services and devices †The identiï cation and resolution of conï icts between security requirements
and other requirements (functional and other quality requirements †The transformation of a consolidated set of security requirements into secu
-rity speciï cations The four objectives listed above obviously remain generic by nature, one should bear in mind though that the forthcoming techniques
so security enforcement mechanisms are indispensable. The design phase of the software service and/or system is a timely moment to enforce
these security mechanisms, since by that phase one must have grasped already a thorough understanding of the application domain and of the requirements to
The security architecture for the system must enforce the visible security prop -erties of components and the relationships between them.
assess and reason about security mechanisms at an early phase in the software development cycle The research topics one must focus on in this subarea relate to model-driven
architecture and security, the compositionality of design models and the study of design patterns for FI services and applications.
The integration of security aspects into this paradigm is the so-called model -driven security 6, leading to a design for assurance methodology in which every
step of the design process is performed taking security as a primary goal. A way of carrying out this integration includes ï rst decomposing security concerns
so that the application architecture and its security architecture is decoupled This makes possible for architects to assess more easily tradeoï €s among diï €erent
security mechanisms, simulate security policies and test security protocols before the implementation phase, where changes are typically far more expensive
In order to achieve this, it is needed ï rst to convert the security require -ments models into a security architecture by means of automatic model trans
-formations. These transformations are interesting, since whilst requirements be -long to the problem-domain, the architecture and design models are within the
solution-domain, so there is an important gap to address. In the context of se -curity modeling, it is extremely relevant to incept ways to model usage control
e g.,, see 21,22, 18), which encompasses traditional access control, trust man -agement and digital rights management and goes beyond these building blocks
what kind of security architecture is required in the context and how to carry out the decomposition of such fairly novel architectures
concerns †security among them †of the whole application have been sepa -rated into diï €erent models,
-ferent concerns †even diï €erent security sub-architectures for diï €erent security requirements †it is required to assure that the composition of all these architec
are large catalogues and surveys on security patterns available 26,13, but the FI applications yet to come
be analyzed, both from a general perspective and from a security perspective for security-critical software systems
4 Security Support in Programming Environments Security Support in Programming Environments is not new; still it remains a
grand challenge, especially in the context of Future Internet (FI) Services. Secur -ing Future Internet Service is inherently a matter of secure software and systems
The context of the future internet services sets the scene in the sense that (1
The search for security support in programming environments has to take this context in account.
the expected security value unless the programs (code) respect these security artefacts that have been produced in the preceding stages.
This sets the stage for model driven security in which transformations of architecture and design
artefacts is essential, as well as the veriï cation of code compliance with various 184 W. Joosen et al
Some of these properties have been embedded in the security spe -ciï c elements of the software design;
other may simply be high priority security requirements that have articulated †such as the appropriate treatment of con
Supporting security requirements in the programming †code †level requires a comprehensive approach. The service creation means must be improved and
extended to deal with security needs. Service creation means both aggregating and composing services from preexisting building blocks (services and more tra
One could argue that security support for service creation must focus on and enable better static veriï cation.
and building blocks that facilitate eï €ective security enforcement at run-time. Dependent on the needs and the state-of-the-art this
the application logic consistently interacts with underpinning security mecha -nisms such as authentication or audit services.
the underpinning security mechanisms and services (e g. supporting mutual non repudiation, attribute based authorization in a cloud platform etc.
security characteristics. The business compositions are very dynamic in nature and span multiple trust domains, resulting in a fragmentation of ownership of
Many security vulnerabilities arise from programming errors that allow an ex -ploit. Future Internet will further reinforce the prominence of highly distributed
ensure that no security hole arises from implementations that exploit the com -putational infrastructure of the Future Internet.
language-based security, in particular type systems, to enforce best-practises currently used in order to prevent cross-site scripting attacks and similar vul
while still maintaining security 4. 3 Platform Support for Security Enforcement Future Internet applications span multiple trust domains,
and the hybrid aggre -gation of content and functionality from diï €erent trust domains requires com
In eï €ect, the security enforcement techniques that are triggered by built-in security services and by
realistic in the FI setting, must address the challenge of complex interactions and of ï nely grained control 15.
-tions, and from a security perspective, the SOP is not strong enough to achieve the appropriate application isolation
Supporting Security Assurance for FI Services. Assurance will play a central role in the development of software based services to provide conï dence
about the desired security level. Assurance must be treated in a holistic manner as an integral constituent of the development process, seamlessly informing and
related models and artefacts satisfy their functional and security requirements and constraints. Obviously the security support in programming environments
that must be delivered will be essential to incept a transverse methodology that enables to manage assurance throughout the software and service development
5 Embedding Security Assurance and Risk management during SDLC Engineering secure Future Internet services demands for at least two traversal
issues, security assurance and risk and cost management during SDLC 5. 1 Security Assurance The main objective is to enable assurance in the development of software based
services to ensure conï dence about their trustworthiness. Our core goal is to incept a transverse methodology that enables to manage assurance throughout
Early detection of security failures in Future Internet applications reduces development costs and improves assurance in the ï nal system.
assurance methods and techniques for early security veriï cation. These methods are applied to abstract models that are developed from requirements to detailed
One main area of research is stepwise reï nement of security, by develop -ing reï nement strategies, from policies down to mechanisms, for more complex
divide-and-conquer approach, where functional and security-related design as -pects can be reï ned independently.
for smoothly integrating security aspects into the system development process at any step of the development
-plex primitives and security properties. Moreover, the Dolev-Yao attacker model 9 used by these tools needs to be extended to include new attack possibilities
Security Assurance in Implementation. Several assurance techniques are available to ensure the security at the level of an implementation.
Security poli -cies can be implemented correctly by construction through a rigorous secure programming discipline. Internet applications can be validated through testing
In that case, it is possible to develop test data generation that speciï cally targets the integration of services, access control policies or speciï c attacks.
required security properties Complementing activities are related to secure programming. This strand addresses a comprehensive solution for program veriï cation,
maximize the eï ciency in the security testing process, and testing of policies 188 W. Joosen et al
Security concerns are speciï ed at the business-level but have to be implemented in complex distributed and adaptable
guarantee that security concerns are taken correctly into account through the whole SDLC. A chain of techniques and tools crossing the above areas is planned
Security Metrics. Measurements are essential for objective analysis of secu -rity systems. Metrics can be used directly for computing risks (e g.,
evolving security requirements, etc. both during system development and operation. Based on the modular approach to risk and cost analysis one needs methods to manage
security requirement engineering, secure architecture and design, secure pro -gramming as well as assurance and the relation to each of these ingredients
During security requirements engineering risk analysis fa -cilitates the identiï cation of relevant requirements. Furthermore, methods for
-tion of security mechanisms intended to fulï l the security requirements, risk and cost analysis can be utilized in selecting the most cost eï cient mechanisms.
following architecture and design phase incorporates the security requirements into the system design. The risk and cost models resulting from the previous
Such cost metrics may also be used in combination with security metrics for the optimization of the balance between risk and cost.
security metrics 190 W. Joosen et al 6 Conclusion We have advocated in this paper the need and the opportunity for ï rmly es
based on research in the areas of software engineering, security engineering and of service engineering. We have clariï ed why generic solutions that ignore the
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Vision, IDEA (2006 13. Group, O.:Security design pattern technical guide http://www. opengroup. org/security/gsp. htm
14. Guâ rses, S f.,Berendt, B.,Santen, T.:Multilateral security requirements analysis for preserving privacy in ubiquitous environments.
In: Proc. of the Workshop on Ubiquitous Knowledge Discovery for Users at ECML/PKDD, pp. 51†64 (2006
15. Hamlen, K. W.,Morrisett, G.,Schneider, F. B.:Computability classes for en -forcement mechanisms.
Extracting relations among security pat -terns. In: SPAQU€ 08 (Int. Workshop on Software Patterns and Quality)( 2008
Security services architecture for secure mobile grid systems. Journal of Systems Architecture. In Press (2010
Language-based information-ï ow security. IEEE Jour -nal on Selected Areas in Communications 21 (1), 2003 (2003
A survey on security patterns Progress in Informatics 5, 35†47 (2008 Towards Formal Validation of Trust and Security
in the Internet of Services Roberto Carbone1, Marius Minea2, Sebastian Alexander Moâ dersheim3 Serena Elisa Ponta4, 5, Mathieu Turuani6,
1 Security & Trust Unit, FBK, Trento, Italy 2 Institute e-Austria, Timisâ¸oara, Romania
the trust and security impact of an option, a minor change, a combination of functionalities, etc.
The formal veriï cation of trust and security of the Internet of Services will signiï cantly boost its development and public acceptance
of trust and security issues, but solving them is extremely hard since making the service components trustworthy is not suï cient:
are already plaguing complex web-based security-sensitive applications, and thus severely aï €ect the development of the future internet.
Moreover, security vali -dation should be carried out at all phases of the service development process in particular during the design phase by the service designers themselves or by
security analysts that support them in their complex tasks, so as to prevent the production and consumption of already ï awed services
Fortunately, a new generation of analyzers for automated security validation at design time has been recently put forth;
-sumption time, thereby signiï cantly improving the all-round security of the Ios In this chapter, we give a brief overview of the main scientiï c and industrial chal
and automated validation of trust and security of service-oriented architectures SOAS). ) This technology, which involves the design of a suitable speciï cation lan
network and service infrastructures, enhance their security and robustness, and thus increase the development and public acceptance of the Ios
that have been developed for the veriï cation of trust and security of services. In Section 4,
and security of SOAS is complex due to three main characteristics of service orientation First, SOAS are heterogeneous:
Towards Formal Validation of Trust and Security in the Internet of Services 195 Second, SOAS are also distributed systems, with functionality and resources
Third, SOAS and their security requirements are continuously evolving: ser -vices may be composed at runtime, agents may join or leave, and client creden
The security properties of SOAS are, moreover, very diverse. The classical data security requirements include conï dentiality and authentication/integrity
Various languages have been proposed to model trust and security of SOAS e g.,, BPEL 24, π calculus 19, F#5, to name a few.
-cated to specifying trust and security aspects of services, their composition, the properties that they should satisfy
deï ned to be close to speciï cation languages for security protocols/services and to procedural and object-oriented programming languages.
they can be used to describe service workï ows and steps in security protocols. For instance, an employee (Alice) changing group membership at the
Finally, we need to model the security properties. While this can be done by using diï €erent languages,
Towards Formal Validation of Trust and Security in the Internet of Services 197 purposes, no agent can access both ï les f1 and f2.
their required security properties and associated policies. In particular, one has to consider the various ways in which component services can be coordinated
-neous security contexts is to integrate diï €erent technologies into a single analysis tool, in such way that they can interact and beneï t from each other†s features
When security constraints are to be respected, it can be very complex to dis -cover or even to describe composition scenarios.
-structed with respect to security goals using the techniques we developed for the veriï cation of security protocols
3. 2 Model Checking of SOAS Model checking 13 is a powerful and automatic technique for verifying con
been obtained for the analysis of security protocols. In the context of SOAS, a model-checking problem is the problem of determining whether a given model â€
†enjoys the security properties speciï ed by a given formula. As mentioned in Section 2,
these security properties can be complex, requiring an expressive logic Most model-checking techniques in this context make a number of simplify
Yet we might be interested in establishing the security of a service that relies on a less insecure channel.
enjoying some given security properties (e g. TLS is used often as a unilateral or a bilateral communication authentic and/or conï dential channel),
communication channels enjoying security-relevant properties, such as authen -ticity, conï dentiality, and resilience Among general model-checking techniques,
trace-based security properties. In particular, the AVANTSSAR Platform in -tegrates a bounded model-checking technique for SOAS 1 that allows one to
express complex security goals that services are expected to meet as well as assumptions on the security oï €ered by the communication channels
3. 3 Channels and Compositional Reasoning A common feature of SOAS is an organization in layers:
Towards Formal Validation of Trust and Security in the Internet of Services 199 of course, undesirable to verify the entire system as a whole:
and security require -ments of a goal service and a description of the available services (including
a speciï cation of their security-relevant behavior, possibly including the local policies they satisfy)
build an orchestration of the available services that meets the security require -ments stated in the policy.
†The Validator takes as input an orchestration and a security goal formally speciï ed in ASLAN,
meets the security goal. If this is the case, then the ASLAN speciï cation of the validated orchestration is given as output, otherwise a counterexam
Towards Formal Validation of Trust and Security in the Internet of Services 201 Vu ln
The landscape of services that require validation of their security is very broad The validation is made more diï cult by the tension between the need for ï exibil
security mechanisms that implement them independently of their use in partic -ular workï ows. There is thus a clear advantage in having a language allowing
-ity, trust management, workï ow security, federation and privacy A highlight of the eï €ectiveness of the AVANTSSAR methods and tools is
security standard is written in natural language that is often subject to inter -pretation. Since the many conï guration options, proï les, protocols, bindings
Towards Formal Validation of Trust and Security in the Internet of Services 203 proï le and which are not.
to perform the same security-critical operations as the legitimate token user Formal validation of trust and security will become a reality in the Internet
of Services only if and when the available technologies will have migrated to in -dustry, as well as to standardization bodies (which are driven mostly by industry
to migrate AVANTSSAR results within SAP Netweaver Security and Identity Management (SAP NW SIM) with the objective of exploiting the AVANTSSAR
provider services fulï ll expected the security desiderata in the considered SAP relevant scenarios. This has included the evaluation of those conï gurations of the
insights in the SAML standard than the security considerations described in Towards Formal Validation of Trust and Security in the Internet of Services 205
there and helped SAP Research to better understand the vulnerability itself and to consolidate the results
security-critical aspects of business processes. An eclipse plug-in extension for NW BPM was proposed through the design and development of a security val
-idation plug-in that enables a business process modeler to easily specify the security goals one wishes to validate such as least privilege
which can be ac -complished by means of the Need-to-Know principle (giving to the users enough
a loan origination process case study with a few security goals and on a more complex aviation maintenance process (designed with 70 human activities.
potential execution paths of the BP under-design against the expected security desiderata. In particular, the migration activity succeeded in overcoming obsta
-cles for the adoption of model-checking techniques to validate security desiderata in industry systems by providing an automatic generation of the formal model on
practitioner nor a security expert. As a successful result, the security validation plug-in is listed currently in the productization road-map of SAP products for
business process management 6 Conclusions and Outlook As exempliï ed by these case studies and success stories, formal validation tech
-nologies can have a decisive impact for the trust and security of the Ios. The
advances will signiï cantly improve the all-round security of the Ios, and thus boost its development and public acceptance
LTL Model Checking for Security Pro -tocols. Journal of Applied Non-classical logics, special issue on Logic and Infor
-mation Security, 403†429 (2009 2. Armando, A.,Carbone, R.,Compagna, L.,Cueâ'llar, J.,Pellegrino, G.,Sorniotti, A
Formal Methods in Security Engineering (FMSE 2008), pp. 1†10. ACM Press New york (2008 4. AVANTSSAR:
Automated Validation of Trust and Security of Service-Oriented Architectures. FP7-ICT-2007-1, Project No. 216471, http://www. avantssar. eu
WS-Security Protocols. In: Bravetti, M.,Nuâ'nëoeez, M.,Zavattaro, G. eds. WS-FM 2006.
A security tool for web services. In: de Boer, F. S.,Bonsangue, M m.,, Graf, S.,de Roever, W.-P
of security protocols. Journal of Computer security 13 (3), 347†390 (2005 9. Boichut, Y.,Heâ'am, P.-C.,Kouchnarenko, O.:
Safely composing security protocols. Formal Methods in System Design 34 (1), 1†36 (2009 16.
Towards Formal Validation of Trust and Security in the Internet of Services 207 17. Dolev, D.,Yao, A.:
On the Security of Public-Key Protocols. IEEE Transactions on Information theory 2 (29)( 1983 18.
Abstraction by Set-Membership †Verifying Security Protocols and Web Services with Databases. In: Proceedings of 17th ACM conference on
Symbolic Analysis of Security Protocols. In: Aldini, A.,Barthe, G.,Gorrieri, R eds.)) FOSAD 2007/2008/2009.
The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol, Version 1. 2. IETF RFC 5246 (Aug. 2008 27.
This article introduces upcoming security challenges for cloud services such as multi-tenancy, transparency and establishing trust into correct
operation, and security interoperability. For each of these challenges, we introduce existing concepts to mitigate these risks and survey related
-lenges for trust and security architectures and mechanisms 4 For which the Internet pioneer Vint Cerf has suggested recently the term â€oeinter
Trust and security are regarded often as an afterthought in this context, but they may ultimately present major inhibitors for the cloud-of-clouds vision.
and discuss the complex trust and security requirements. Fur -thermore, we survey existing components to overcome these security and privacy
risks. We will explain the state-of-the-art in addressing these requirements and give an overview of related ongoing international,
2 Trust and Security Limitations of Global Cloud Infrastructures 2. 1 Cloud Security Oï €erings Today
According to the analyst enterprise Forrester research and their study â€oesecurity and the Cloud†17 the cloud security market is expected to grow to 1. 5 billion
$ by 2015 and to approach 5%of overall IT SECURITY spending. Whereas today identity management and encryption solutions represent the largest share of this
3. a new range of providers oï €ering cloud security services to add external security to public clouds
Trustworthy Clouds Underpinning the Future Internet 211 An example for the ï rst category is the Google gov. app cloud launched in
Other cloud providers also adapt basic service security to the needs of spe -ciï c markets and communities.
This allows tailor made solutions to speciï c security concerns-in particular in view of the needs of larger customers.
the base security of Microsoft public cloud services is adapted to the targeted market. Whereas Microsoft uses, e g.,
even though they oï €er only limited base security and largely transfer responsibility for security to the customer.
Therefore in parallel to the diï €erentiated security oï €erings via bespoke private or community clouds, there
is also a growing complementary service market to enable enhanced security for public clouds. Here a prime target is the small to mid-size enterprise market
Examples for supplementary services are threat surveillance (e g,., Alertlogic access-and identity management (e g.,, Novell, IBM), virtual private network
For the security objectives when adopting clouds for hosting critical systems we believe that today†s datacenters are the benchmark for new cloud deploy
For security this argument leads to two requirements for cloud adoption by enterprises: The ï rst is that with respect to security and trust, new solutions
such as the cloud or cloud-of-clouds will be compared and benchmarked against existing solutions such as enterprise or outsourced datacenters.
3 New Security and Privacy Risks and Emerging Security Controls Cloud computing being a novel technology introduces new security risks 7 that
need to be mitigated. As a consequence, cautious monitoring and management of security risks 13 is essential (see Figure 1 for a sketch following 12
We now survey selected security and privacy risks where importance has been increased by the cloud and identify potential security controls for mitigating
those risks 1. Survey of Risks 2. Design of Controls 3. Implement of Controls 4. Monitoring
of Effectiveness Fig. 1. Simpliï ed Process for Managing Security Risks 12 Trustworthy Clouds Underpinning the Future Internet 213
3. 1 Isolation Breach between Multiple Customers Cloud environments aim at eï ciencies of scale by increased sharing resources
between multiple customers. As a consequence, data leakage and service disrup -tions gain importance and may propagate through such shared resources.
A second important security risk is the accidental or malicious misbehavior of in -siders that increased due to global operations and a focus on low cost.
This risk is hard to mitigate since security controls need to strike a balance between the power needed to administrate and
the security of the administrated systems A practical approach to minimize this risk is to adhere to a least-privilege
†Security administrators can design and deï ne policies but cannot play any other roles
Due to the corresponding logging, the security auditors can later determine which employee has held what privileges at any given point in time.
security incidents are largely invisible to a customer: Data corruption may not be detected for a long time. Data leakage by skilled insiders is unlikely to be
the right to correction and deletion as well as the necessity of reasonable security safeguards for the collected data
and organizational security safeguards and contractual commitments (e g.,, Ser -vice Level Agreements, Binding Corporate Rules
cloud service provider could prove to have an appropriate level of security mea -surements by undergoing acknowledged auditing and certiï cation processes on
Security Integration and Transparency. The third challenge is to allow customers to continue operating a secure environment.
This means that security infrastruc -ture and systems within the cloud such as intrusion detection, event handling
-all security landscape for each individual customers. Depending on the type of systems, this can be achieved by providing more transparency (e g.,
of log-ï les) but may also require security technology within the cloud. One ex
From a security perspective, this will raise new challenges. Customers need to provide a consistent security state over multiple clouds
and provide means to securely fail-over across multiple clouds. Similarly, services will be composed from underlying services from other clouds.
on security and privacy mechanisms that were developed for service-oriented ar -chitectures and outsourcing. Unlike outsourcing, clouds are deployed on a global
We surveyed security risks that gain importance in this setting and surveyed potential solutions Today, demand for cloud security has increased
but the oï €ered security is still limited. We expect this to change and clouds with stronger security guarantees
will appear in the market. Initially, they will focus on security mechanisms like isolation, conï dentiality through encryption,
and data integrity through authen -tication. However, we expect that they will then move on to the harder problems
such as providing veriï able transparency, to integrate with security management systems of the customers, and to limit the risks imposed by misbehaving cloud
providers and their employees Acknowledgments. We thank Ninja Marnau and Eva Schlehahn from the Independent Centre for Privacy Protection Schleswig-Holstein for substantial
-ing and security in the cloud. SIGOPS Oper. Syst. Rev. 44, 86†94 (2010 doi:
ACM Workshop on Cloud computing Security (CCSW€ 09), pp. 85†90 ACM Press, New york (2009 7. Cloud Security Alliance (CSA:
Top threats to cloud computing, ver -sion 1. 0. March 2010), http://www. cloudsecurityalliance. org/topthreats
Security and the cloud: Looking at the opportunity beyond the obstacle Forrester research (October 2010 18.
Cloud computing and security. Lecture Univ. Stuttgart (November 2009 26. Weichert, T.:Cloud computing und Datenschutz (2009
-formation Security and Privacy, pp. 121†167. Springer, New york (2010 4. Bussard, L.,Neven, G.,Preiss, F. S.:
has diï €erent requirements with regard to quality, reliability and security from the underlying networks. The number of stakeholders who partici
-tween domains as well as inter-domain security have to be addressed in federated testbeds as well as in the real Internet.
increase situation awareness (and with this overall security) by sharing infor -mation. Nevertheless, the operators of the testbeds we considered in our setup
Applications, Security, Safety, and Architec -tures. IEEE Communications Surveys 2 (1)( 1999), http://www. comsoc. org/pubs
•Trust Management and Security, privacy and data protection mechanisms of dis -tributed data •An addressing scheme, where identity and location are embedded not in the same
•Support of security, reliability, robustness, mobility, context, service support, or -chestration and management for both the communication resources and the ser
-vacy, security and governance and with a diversity of issues related to Internet†s ef -fectiveness and inclusive character.
ensuring trust, security and data protection with transparent and democratic governance and control of offered services as guiding principles (10,11
Dependability and security; scal -ability; services (i e.:cost, service-driven configuration, simplified services composi -tion over heterogeneous networks, large scale and dynamic multi-service coexistence
In addition, security risks currently present in network environments request for immediate attention. This could be achieved by building trustworthy network environments to assure security
levels and manage threats in interoperable frameworks for autonomous monitoring 1. 2 The Vision of a Modern Self-Managing Network
Performance and Security) 14, as well as the fundamental network functions such as routing, forwarding, monitoring, discovery, fault-detection and fault-removal,
guarantee higher levels of scalability, mobility, flexibility, security, reliability and Enhanced Network Self-Manageability in the Scope of Future Internet Development 283
device monitoring, service levels and application management, security, ongoing maintenance, troubleshooting, planning, and other tasks †ideally all coordinated and
security and manageability is -sues, considered as non-priority features in the 70s 3 should be addressed now
-ing with guaranteed performance and Qos, including manageable security services †A new layered architecture for the Control and Management Plane that
The proposed architecture also addresses two major security aspects: secure oper -ation of the VI provisioning process,
and provisioning dynamic security services to address challenge#5. Fig. 1 shows the reference model of our architecture as it
influence future investment decisions based on capital, security, compute power and energy efficiency In order to enable realistic and effective reasoning at provisioning
Management, Mobility, Qoe, Qos and Security This ontology at the intermediate layers is represented in FINLAN by the
is the encryption for security at the intermediate layer. In this example, in the actual TCP IP protocols architecture, the layers 3 and 4 are not able to un
-derstand the security need in a context and its complexities usually must be controlled by the Application layer.
can inform semantically this security need to the Net-Ontology layer. By this the related complexities can be handled at the Net-Ontology layer level, instead
delivery guarantee, Qos, security and others 2. 1 Collaboration to the Autoi Planes One of the Autonomic Internet project expectations is to support the needs
-ability, security and Qos. The FINLAN project can contribute in its challenges some described in 1, 3, 12,
Security, can be requested to the network, making the {user, service, content -centric approaches simpler, as shown in the sample code below
Security "/>owl: Individual ><owl: Individual rdf: about="&entity; Multimediaconference "><rdf: type rdf: resource="&entity; Content
IEEE/IFIP New Technologies, Mobility and Security Conference (2009 8 Pereira, J. H. S.,Kofuji, S. T.,Rosa, P. F.:
IEEE/IFIP New Technologies, Mobility and Security Conference 2009 9 Pereira, J. H. S.,Kofuji, S. T.,Rosa, P. F.:
WS-Messaging and WS-Security complement the stack of technologies On the other hand, an increasing number of popular Web and Web 2. 0 applications
autonomous systems to supply users with the necessary infrastructure and a security framework Concerning the second point,
-ing, security, etc. Thus, the HB, which can be seen as the evolution of today†s Home
media flow adaptation, routing/forwarding and security The goal of the Virtual CAN layer is to offer to higher layers enhanced connectivity
-tion, security, and monitoring features. The set of MANES form together a Virtual Content-Aware Network,
from different purposes (content-aware forwarding, Qos, security, unicast/multicast etc.).) The architecture supports creation of parallel VCANS over the same network
degree of security, etc. The amount of VCAN resources can be changed during net -work functioning based on monitoring developed at CAN layer
3. 3 CAN Layer Security The aim of the security subsystem within the CAN Layer is twofold:
1) data confiden -tiality, integrity and authenticity; and 2) intelligent and distributed access control policy-based enforcement
-lection of three degrees of security, being: public traffic, secret content, and private communications. In public traffic no security
or privacy guarantees are enforced Secret content addresses content confidentiality and authentication by applying com -mon cryptographic techniques over the packets†payload.
security along all CAN domains and discretely apply the security mechanisms only where necessary to guarantee the required security level, with respect to the security
degree invoked. The evaluation algorithm considers the user flow characteristics CAN policies and present network conditions.
In order to attain the required flexibil -ity, the related security architecture was designed according to the hop-by-hop model
7 on top of the MANES routers The second objective will pursue a content-aware approach that will be enforced
Such security enforcement will be done ac -cordingly to policies and filtering rules obtained from the CANMGR.
and traffic filtering rules by executing security related algo -rithms over information gathered by the monitoring subsystem.
Content-aware security technologies typically perform deep content inspection of data traversing a security element placed in a specific point in the net
-work. The proposed approach differs by being based on MANE routers, which will be used to construct CANS
MANE€ s related security functions are then to perform attacks†identification (e g port-scan, IP spoofing,
-vice/Experience, security, and monitoring features, in cooperation with the other ele -ments of the ecosystem.
security and privacy as well as IPR protection; operation and research monitoring as well as experiment control; and the issue of defining and
and cultural heritage with safety and security in urban spaces. This approach draws on and integrates Future Internet technologies (such as augmented reality services for the
-tural heritage in their city and also to an exploration of the privacy and security issues
development of essential services for health, security, police and fire departments governance and delivery of public services
-sure the required level of security and privacy of information •Open Urban Services Development.
•Public Safety and Security: sensor-activated video surveillance systems; location -aware enhanced security systems; estimation and risk prevention systems (e g. sen
as well as security, privacy, and trust 12 13. Cross-domain NG Iot platforms may foster the creation of new services taking advantage of the increasing levels of effi
trust, security, and privacy) in a standard, easy and flexible way. Now that a number of
Security Privacy and Trust Smart Santander Node WISELIB User Developed App Tinyos Contiki Sunspot  Tinyos Contiki Sunspot Â
i) Access control and IOT Node Security subsys -tem, ii) Experiment Support Subsystem, iii) the Facility Management Support Sub
Security and Trust Introduction to Part III Security Design for an Inter-Domain Publish/Subscribe Architecture
Introduction Basic Concepts Architecture Phases of Communication Related Work Conclusion and Future Work References Engineering Secure Future Internet Services
Security Requirements Engineering Secure Service Architecture and Design Security Support in Programming Environments Secure Service Composition
Secure Service Programming Platform Support for Security Enforcement Embedding Security Assurance and Risk management during SDLC
Security Assurance Risk and Cost Aware SDLC Conclusion Towards Formal Validation of Trust and Security in the Internet of Services
Introduction Specification Languages Automated Validation Techniques Orchestration Model Checking of SOAS Channels and Compositional Reasoning
Abstract Interpretation The AVANTSSAR Platform and Library Case studies, Success Stories, and Industry Migration Conclusions and Outlook
Trustworthy Clouds Underpinning the Future Internet Cloud computing and the Future Internet Trust and Security Limitations of Global Cloud Infrastructures
Cloud Security Offerings Today Today's Datacenters as the Benchmark for the Cloud New Security and Privacy Risks and Emerging Security Controls
Isolation Breach between Multiple Customers Insider Attacks by Cloud Administrators Failures of the Cloud Management Systems
Lack of Transparency and Guarantees What about Privacy Risks Open Research Challenges Outlook †The Path Ahead
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